From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755393AbcEEMPy (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 May 2016 08:15:54 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:44870 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754498AbcEEMPw (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 May 2016 08:15:52 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.24,582,1455004800"; d="scan'208";a="969319295" From: "Tian, Kevin" To: Yongji Xie , David Laight , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org" CC: "alex.williamson@redhat.com" , "bhelgaas@google.com" , "aik@ozlabs.ru" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , "paulus@samba.org" , "mpe@ellerman.id.au" , "joro@8bytes.org" , "warrier@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "nikunj@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "eric.auger@linaro.org" , "will.deacon@arm.com" , "gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "alistair@popple.id.au" , "ruscur@russell.cc" Subject: RE: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported Thread-Topic: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported Thread-Index: AQHRoIMDw+bjSjW8wkusiJ7fWPCsmJ+muJEA//+EsACAAIcFkP//kPaAgAPMIVCAACQUuoAAByVg Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 12:15:46 +0000 Message-ID: References: <1461761010-5452-1-git-send-email-xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1461761010-5452-6-git-send-email-xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6D5F4B52B5@AcuExch.aculab.com> <4be013bc-e81b-84c5-06d3-e1b3f46b3227@linux.vnet.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <4be013bc-e81b-84c5-06d3-e1b3f46b3227@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ctpclassification: CTP_IC x-titus-metadata-40: eyJDYXRlZ29yeUxhYmVscyI6IiIsIk1ldGFkYXRhIjp7Im5zIjoiaHR0cDpcL1wvd3d3LnRpdHVzLmNvbVwvbnNcL0ludGVsMyIsImlkIjoiN2FhYTk4NDEtOTFiMS00Y2Q3LWFmMjAtY2I4OTE3NjE0MGQ5IiwicHJvcHMiOlt7Im4iOiJDVFBDbGFzc2lmaWNhdGlvbiIsInZhbHMiOlt7InZhbHVlIjoiQ1RQX0lDIn1dfV19LCJTdWJqZWN0TGFiZWxzIjpbXSwiVE1DVmVyc2lvbiI6IjE1LjkuNi42IiwiVHJ1c3RlZExhYmVsSGFzaCI6IndsWjk0Z3Z0SmNEY1d2MWZ3bXU1Z1FjaFNsd1padTdPNHVCXC9MSFM1SkhZPSJ9 x-originating-ip: [10.239.127.40] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by mail.home.local id u45CFv2B010255 > From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com] > Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM > > Hi David and Kevin, > > On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote: > > > From: Tian, Kevin > >> Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37 > > ... > >>> Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from > >>> guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we > >>> can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in > >>> normal code path such as para-virtualized guest kernel on PPC64. > >>> > >> Then how do you prevent malicious guest kernel accessing it? > > Or a malicious guest driver for an ethernet card setting up > > the receive buffer ring to contain a single word entry that > > contains the address associated with an MSI-X interrupt and > > then using a loopback mode to cause a specific packet be > > received that writes the required word through that address. > > > > Remember the PCIe cycle for an interrupt is a normal memory write > > cycle. > > > > David > > > > If we have enough permission to load a malicious driver or > kernel, we can easily break the guest without exposed > MSI-X table. > > I think it should be safe to expose MSI-X table if we can > make sure that malicious guest driver/kernel can't use > the MSI-X table to break other guest or host. The > capability of IRQ remapping could provide this > kind of protection. > With IRQ remapping it doesn't mean you can pass through MSI-X structure to guest. I know actual IRQ remapping might be platform specific, but at least for Intel VT-d specification, MSI-X entry must be configured with a remappable format by host kernel which contains an index into IRQ remapping table. The index will find a IRQ remapping entry which controls interrupt routing for a specific device. If you allow a malicious program random index into MSI-X entry of assigned device, the hole is obvious... Above might make sense only for a IRQ remapping implementation which doesn't rely on extended MSI-X format (e.g. simply based on BDF). If that's the case for PPC, then you should build MSI-X passthrough based on this fact instead of general IRQ remapping enabled or not. Thanks Kevin