From: Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin <cdupontd@redhat.com>
To: muriloo@linux.ibm.com
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mopsfelder@gmail.com,
Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs()
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 11:51:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B954A683-EE43-4469-B57A-EB8C6B671BEC@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <A5CD1C91-F5D0-4109-9894-824184362B5C@redhat.com>
> On 28 Apr 2022, at 11:46, Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin <cdupontd@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 15 Apr 2022, at 05:51, Murilo Opsfelder Araújo <muriloo@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 4/14/22 23:30, Murilo Opsfelder Araujo wrote:
>>> GCC 12 enhanced -Waddress when comparing array address to null [0],
>>> which warns:
>>> drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c: In function ‘vp_del_vqs’:
>>> drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:257:29: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the pointer operand in ‘vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks + (sizetype)((long unsigned int)i * 256)’ must not be NULL [-Waddress]
>>> 257 | if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
>>> | ^~~~~~
>>> In fact, the verification is comparing the result of a pointer
>>> arithmetic, the address "msix_affinity_masks + i", which will always
>>> evaluate to true.
>>> Under the hood, free_cpumask_var() calls kfree(), which is safe to pass
>>> NULL, not requiring non-null verification. So remove the verification
>>> to make compiler happy (happy compiler, happy life).
>>> [0] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102103
>>> Signed-off-by: Murilo Opsfelder Araujo <muriloo@linux.ibm.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 3 +--
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>> diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
>>> index d724f676608b..5046efcffb4c 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
>>> @@ -254,8 +254,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev)
>>> if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) {
>>> for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++)
>>> - if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
>>> - free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
>>> + free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
>>> }
>>> if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) {
>>
>> After I sent this message, I realized that Christophe (copied here)
>> had already proposed a fix:
>>
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220414150855.2407137-4-dinechin@redhat.com/
>>
>> Christophe,
>>
>> Since free_cpumask_var() calls kfree() and kfree() is null-safe,
>> can we just drop this null verification and call free_cpumask_var() right away?
>
> Apologies for the delay in responding, broken laptop…
>
> In the case where CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is not defined, we have:
>
> typedef struct cpumask cpumask_var_t[1];
>
> So that vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i] is statically not null (that’s the warning)
> but also a static pointer, so not kfree-safe IMO.
… which also renders my own patch invalid :-/
Compiler warnings are good. Clearly not sufficient.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-28 10:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-15 2:30 Murilo Opsfelder Araujo
2022-04-15 3:51 ` Murilo Opsfelder Araújo
2022-04-28 9:46 ` Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin
2022-04-28 9:51 ` Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin [this message]
2022-04-28 9:55 ` Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin
2022-04-28 11:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2022-04-28 11:52 ` Christophe Marie Francois Dupont de Dinechin
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