From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752426AbbJZTS1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Oct 2015 15:18:27 -0400 Received: from mail-lf0-f52.google.com ([209.85.215.52]:36734 "EHLO mail-lf0-f52.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751920AbbJZTS0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Oct 2015 15:18:26 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1445625080.2459.349.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1a64e3ea572fd4b660581ae0362bb777fd38a572.1445539084.git.dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> <1445625080.2459.349.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2015 21:18:24 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 3/6] evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded From: Dmitry Kasatkin To: Mimi Zohar Cc: linux-ima-devel , linux-security-module , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Dmitry Kasatkin Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, I added error printing to the patch http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git/log/?h=ima-next Dmitry On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2015-10-22 at 21:49 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: >> In order to enable EVM before starting 'init' process, >> evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Before it was >> indicating that HMAC key is loaded. When EVM loads >> X509 before calling 'init', it is possible to enable >> EVM to start signature based verification. >> >> This patch defines bits to enable EVM if key of any type >> is loaded. > > Thanks, Dmitry. There's one comment inline. > >> Changes in v2: >> * EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC >> * EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509 >> >> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin >> --- >> security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 3 +++ >> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 ++ >> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 +++++- >> security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 4 ++-- >> 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h >> index 88bfe77..f5f1272 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h >> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h >> @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ >> >> #include "../integrity.h" >> >> +#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 >> +#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 >> + >> extern int evm_initialized; >> extern char *evm_hmac; >> extern char *evm_hash; >> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c >> index 159ef3e..34e1a6f 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c >> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) >> struct shash_desc *desc; >> >> if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { >> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) >> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); > > init_desc() is called from a couple of different places. In some > instances, like when converting from a signature to an hmac, if > init_desc() fails, the xattr isn't converted to an HMAC. No big deal. > But there are other cases, like when a protected xattr is modified, > failing the write will make the file inaccessible. Does there need to > be an error msg of some sort or an audit msg? > > Mimi > >> tfm = &hmac_tfm; >> algo = evm_hmac; >> } else { >> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c >> index 519de0a..420d94d 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c >> @@ -475,7 +475,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); >> #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 >> void __init evm_load_x509(void) >> { >> - integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); >> + int rc; >> + >> + rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); >> + if (!rc) >> + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509; >> } >> #endif >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c >> index cf12a04..3f775df 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c >> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, >> char temp[80]; >> int i, error; >> >> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized) >> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) >> return -EPERM; >> >> if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) >> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, >> >> error = evm_init_key(); >> if (!error) { >> - evm_initialized = 1; >> + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC; >> pr_info("initialized\n"); >> } else >> pr_err("initialization failed\n"); > > -- Thanks, Dmitry