From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751987AbdHGRgC (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Aug 2017 13:36:02 -0400 Received: from mail-io0-f175.google.com ([209.85.223.175]:38033 "EHLO mail-io0-f175.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751429AbdHGRf7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Aug 2017 13:35:59 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170726170051.28328-2-thgarnie@google.com> References: <20170726170051.28328-1-thgarnie@google.com> <20170726170051.28328-2-thgarnie@google.com> From: Kees Cook Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 10:35:57 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: OUg1YUrnMbWzG1hmnVRKdXN1KqM Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check To: Thomas Garnier Cc: Russell King , Andy Lutomirski , Will Drewry , Thomas Gleixner , Al Viro , Dave Martin , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Pratyush Anand , Chris Metcalf , leonard.crestez@nxp.com, "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , LKML , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:00 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Disable the generic address limit check in favor of an architecture > specific optimized implementation. The generic implementation using > pending work flags did not work well with ARM and alignment faults. > > The address limit is checked on each syscall return path to user-mode > path as well as the irq user-mode return function. If the address limit > was changed, a function is called to stop the kernel with an explicit > message. > > The address limit check has to be done before any pending work because > they can reset the address limit. For example the lkdtm address limit > check does not work because the signal to kill the process will reset > the user-mode address limit. > > Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier > --- > arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 11 +++++++++++ > arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++ > 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S > index 0b60adf4a5d9..99c908226065 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #ifdef CONFIG_AEABI > #include > #endif > @@ -48,10 +49,14 @@ ret_fast_syscall: > UNWIND(.fnstart ) > UNWIND(.cantunwind ) > disable_irq_notrace @ disable interrupts > + ldr r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] > + cmp r2, #TASK_SIZE > + blne addr_limit_check_failed > ldr r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ re-check for syscall tracing > tst r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK > bne fast_work_pending > > + > /* perform architecture specific actions before user return */ > arch_ret_to_user r1, lr > > @@ -74,6 +79,9 @@ ret_fast_syscall: > UNWIND(.cantunwind ) > str r0, [sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF]! @ save returned r0 > disable_irq_notrace @ disable interrupts > + ldr r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] > + cmp r2, #TASK_SIZE > + blne addr_limit_check_failed > ldr r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ re-check for syscall tracing > tst r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK > beq no_work_pending > @@ -106,6 +114,9 @@ ENTRY(ret_to_user) > ret_slow_syscall: > disable_irq_notrace @ disable interrupts > ENTRY(ret_to_user_from_irq) > + ldr r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] > + cmp r2, #TASK_SIZE > + blne addr_limit_check_failed > ldr r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] > tst r1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK > bne slow_work_pending > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c > index 5814298ef0b7..5769c15cff89 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c > @@ -673,3 +673,8 @@ struct page *get_signal_page(void) > > return page; > } > + > +asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) > +{ > + panic("Incorrect address limit while returning to user-mode."); > +} Instead of taking the entire system down, how about a WARN/kill combo instead? If it's too late for "force_sig(SIGKILL, current)", then likely we should perform a "do_group_exit(SIGKILL)". -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security