From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 12:28:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXEyStoqmvvQirxt_GXTnO2qQjOxtQGzHzQeCdRCYzT7uA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Tue, 27 Aug 2024 at 00:44, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub
> launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing
> a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be
> called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 8 ++
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> index d33ccbc4a2c6..baf42d6d0796 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> @@ -135,6 +135,14 @@ void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi)
> *hi = upper_32_bits(data);
> }
>
> +static inline
> +void efi_set_u64_form(u32 lo, u32 hi, u64 *data)
> +{
> + u64 upper = hi;
> +
> + *data = lo | upper << 32;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Allocation types for calls to boottime->allocate_pages.
> */
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> index f8e465da344d..04786c1b3b5d 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/pci.h>
> #include <linux/stddef.h>
> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>
> #include <asm/efi.h>
> #include <asm/e820/types.h>
> @@ -923,6 +925,99 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned long *kernel_entry)
> return efi_adjust_memory_range_protection(addr, kernel_text_size);
> }
>
> +static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
> + struct boot_params *boot_params)
> +{
> + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
> + struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
> + bool updated = false;
> + int i;
> +
> + txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
> + if (!txt_info)
> + return false;
> +
> + os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
> + if (!os_mle)
> + return false;
> +
> + os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
> +
> + policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
> + if (!policy)
> + return false;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
> + if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
> + policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
> + updated = true;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
> + * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
> + * of the Secure Launch boot.
> + */
> + if (image) {
> + struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base +
> + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
> + u64 cmdline_ptr;
> +
> + boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
> + boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
> + boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
> + boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
> + boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
> + boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
> + boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
> + boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
> + boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
> + efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr,
> + &cmdline_ptr);
> + boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
> + }
> +
> + return updated;
> +}
> +
> +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params)
> +{
> + struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo;
> + efi_guid_t guid = SLR_TABLE_GUID;
> + dl_handler_func handler_callback;
> + struct slr_table *slrt;
> +
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch
> + * is being requested.
> + */
> + slrt = (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid);
> + if (!slrt || slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the
> + * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version.
> + */
> + if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params))
> + return;
> +
> + /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */
> + dlinfo = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO);
> +
> + handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler;
> +
> + handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context);
> +
> + unreachable();
> +}
> +
> static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr,
> struct boot_params *boot_params)
> {
> @@ -1050,6 +1145,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
> goto fail;
> }
>
> + /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */
> + efi_secure_launch(boot_params);
> +
> /*
> * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's
> * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI.
> --
> 2.39.3
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-27 10:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-26 22:38 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2024-08-27 17:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 20:09 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:09 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-28 20:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-29 13:23 ` Jonathan McDowell
2024-08-29 13:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 15:13 ` ross.philipson
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