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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	 linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	 dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com,  bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	 James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org,  jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu,  herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,  ebiederm@xmission.com,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
	 kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	 trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 12:28:10 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXEyStoqmvvQirxt_GXTnO2qQjOxtQGzHzQeCdRCYzT7uA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Tue, 27 Aug 2024 at 00:44, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub
> launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing
> a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be
> called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

> ---
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h  |  8 ++
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> index d33ccbc4a2c6..baf42d6d0796 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> @@ -135,6 +135,14 @@ void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi)
>         *hi = upper_32_bits(data);
>  }
>
> +static inline
> +void efi_set_u64_form(u32 lo, u32 hi, u64 *data)
> +{
> +       u64 upper = hi;
> +
> +       *data = lo | upper << 32;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Allocation types for calls to boottime->allocate_pages.
>   */
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> index f8e465da344d..04786c1b3b5d 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
>  #include <linux/efi.h>
>  #include <linux/pci.h>
>  #include <linux/stddef.h>
> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>
>  #include <asm/efi.h>
>  #include <asm/e820/types.h>
> @@ -923,6 +925,99 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned long *kernel_entry)
>         return efi_adjust_memory_range_protection(addr, kernel_text_size);
>  }
>
> +static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
> +                                                struct boot_params *boot_params)
> +{
> +       struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
> +       struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
> +       struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
> +       bool updated = false;
> +       int i;
> +
> +       txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
> +       if (!txt_info)
> +               return false;
> +
> +       os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
> +       if (!os_mle)
> +               return false;
> +
> +       os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
> +
> +       policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
> +       if (!policy)
> +               return false;
> +
> +       for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
> +               if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
> +                       policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
> +                       updated = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
> +       }
> +
> +       /*
> +        * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
> +        * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
> +        * of the Secure Launch boot.
> +        */
> +       if (image) {
> +               struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base +
> +                                           offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
> +               u64 cmdline_ptr;
> +
> +               boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
> +               boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
> +               boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
> +               boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
> +               boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
> +               boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
> +               boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
> +               boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
> +               boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
> +               efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr,
> +                                &cmdline_ptr);
> +               boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
> +       }
> +
> +       return updated;
> +}
> +
> +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params)
> +{
> +       struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo;
> +       efi_guid_t guid = SLR_TABLE_GUID;
> +       dl_handler_func handler_callback;
> +       struct slr_table *slrt;
> +
> +       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH))
> +               return;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch
> +        * is being requested.
> +        */
> +       slrt = (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid);
> +       if (!slrt || slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
> +               return;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the
> +        * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version.
> +        */
> +       if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params))
> +               return;
> +
> +       /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */
> +       dlinfo = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO);
> +
> +       handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler;
> +
> +       handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context);
> +
> +       unreachable();
> +}
> +
>  static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr,
>                                     struct boot_params *boot_params)
>  {
> @@ -1050,6 +1145,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
>                 goto fail;
>         }
>
> +       /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */
> +       efi_secure_launch(boot_params);
> +
>         /*
>          * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's
>          * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI.
> --
> 2.39.3
>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-27 10:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-26 22:38 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:29   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:28   ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2024-08-27 17:19     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 20:09   ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:09   ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:14     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-28 20:19       ` ross.philipson
2024-08-29 13:23         ` Jonathan McDowell
2024-08-29 13:28           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 15:13             ` ross.philipson

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