From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31CC6C41513 for ; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 18:55:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1354614AbjHQSyu (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Aug 2023 14:54:50 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57026 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1354638AbjHQSy3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Aug 2023 14:54:29 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8CDF02727; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 11:54:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2ADD262086; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 18:54:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EF3D6C433C7; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 18:54:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1692298466; bh=zmip0tMuh9lYHT7sGEmnyDeO+ajsiVS2dTUwRSKneNY=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=uMYTwU1CDa+fafEbVopJECeswGaU5o+F9LGde7Hsp8Vi2p/5yy2d89sNgg+mEjQLE O3U5SchcKIb/uO+/+yry6yG/uCnMPED+Vm6N76TAKmv0Jj4CzbpcfZtUaPOarUGhYg U81fwmBqImBfLlmXqBZ7egKGQkiYq33pji5Yg1zOKJMzQBb1vjCSYkmcPDx/95KZbZ aPaS8orFsAdhZ4pjKDxXN9J8r5GLOxQRvFNqyrkWmkkU4ad9qmbBLVePSZsgqncx/O pdaRr6P09gQDJcKXsuKbedCLsA+rFohPLr2wiSteWTGw4YcpcuR7ja8RDs7m/43q6Y 4D1L9zeKaiQbA== Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2023 18:54:23 +0000 Message-Id: Cc: , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Eric Snowberg" , , X-Mailer: aerc 0.14.0 References: <20230817140407.1599240-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> In-Reply-To: <20230817140407.1599240-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu Aug 17, 2023 at 2:04 PM UTC, Eric Snowberg wrote: > Systems booted with shim have a Forbidden Signature Database called mokx. > During boot, hashes and certs contained within the mokx are loaded into t= he > blacklist keyring. When calling verify_pkcs7_message_sig the contents of > the blacklist keyring (or revocation list) are referenced when validating > keys on the platform keyring. Currently, when validating against the > secondary or builtin keyrings, the revocation list is not referenced. Mo= ve > up the check to allow the revocation list to be used with all keyrings, > including the secondary and builtin, allowing the system owner to take > corrective action should a vulnerability be found within keys contained > within either keyring. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar > --- > v2 changes: > Since this one seems to have been forgotten, added the two Reviewed-by ta= gs. > Unless there are any objections, could this be picked up? Applied to -next. BR, Jarkko