From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Christian Heusel" <christian@heusel.eu>
Cc: "Peter Huewe" <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
"Jason Gunthorpe" <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<regressions@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [REGRESSION][BISECTED] tpm: Popping noise in USB headphones since 1b6d7f9eb150
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2024 04:44:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D5Z62H0XCOQM.J4V5ZDH9E7C7@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b3a01060-f59b-430d-afcc-48c5ec628bcb@heusel.eu>
On Tue Nov 26, 2024 at 1:42 PM EET, Christian Heusel wrote:
> On 24/10/25 05:47PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Yeah, this is on the list.
> >
> > See: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219383#c5
> >
> > I had a fix for the AMD boot-time issue already over a month ago
> > but unfortunately took time to get enough feedback.
> >
> > BR, Jarkko
>
> I'm not sure if this is supposed to be fixed, but AFAIK we hoped that
> the patchset that was mentioned in bugzilla also helped this issue.
>
> The reporter said that the bug is still present in 6.12.1, so this might
> need further poking 🤔
I'd suggest a workaround for the time being.
In 6.12 we added this for (heavy) IMA use:
tpm.disable_pcr_integrity= [HW,TPM]
Do not protect PCR registers from unintended physical
access, or interposers in the bus by the means of
having an integrity protected session wrapped around
TPM2_PCR_Extend command. Consider this in a situation
where TPM is heavily utilized by IMA, thus protection
causing a major performance hit, and the space where
machines are deployed is by other means guarded.
Similarly it might make sense to have "tpm.disable_random_integrity"
that disables the feature introduced by the failing commit.
What do you think?
>
> Cheers,
> Chris
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-30 2:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-25 0:11 Christian Heusel
2024-10-25 14:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-26 11:42 ` Christian Heusel
2024-11-30 2:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-12-02 22:15 ` Stefan Berger
2024-12-03 6:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-09 12:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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