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From: "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>
To: "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Boqun Feng" <boqun@kernel.org>, "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
	"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
	"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>,
	"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
	"Alice Ryhl" <aliceryhl@google.com>,
	"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
	"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
	"Carlos Llamas" <cmllamas@google.com>,
	rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors
Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2026 16:52:45 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DGDPG8TL1IGS.3OVN0KU25D9YA@garyguo.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260212-rust-uid-v1-1-deff4214c766@google.com>

On Fri Feb 13, 2026 at 2:00 AM CST, Jann Horn wrote:
> Linux has separate subjective and objective task credentials, see the
> comment above `struct cred`. Clarify which accessor functions operate on
> which set of credentials.
>
> Also document that Task::euid() is a very weird operation. You can see how
> weird it is by grepping for task_euid() - binder is its only user.
> Task::euid() obtains the objective effective UID - it looks at the
> credentials of the task for purposes of acting on it as an object, but then
> accesses the effective UID (which the credentials.7 man page describes as
> "[...] used by the kernel to determine the permissions that the process
> will have when accessing shared resources [...]").
>
> For context:
> Arguably, binder's use of task_euid() is a theoretical security problem,
> which only has no impact on Android because Android has no setuid binaries
> executable by apps.

If there's no setuid binary, then the `task_euid` can also just be replaced with
`task_uid`?

> commit 29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task")
> fixed that by removing that only user of task_euid(), but the fix got
> reverted in commit c21a80ca0684 ("binder: fix test regression due to
> sender_euid change") because some Android test started failing.

What exactly is relying on the current behaviour? It'll better to fix that and
remove `task_euid` completely as I find "objective effective UID" quite
confusing, even with disclaimer that it shouldn't be used.

Best,
Gary


>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> ---
>  rust/kernel/task.rs | 9 ++++++---
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/task.rs b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> index 49fad6de0674..33e6d44b9a15 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/task.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/task.rs
> @@ -223,14 +223,17 @@ pub fn pid(&self) -> Pid {
>          unsafe { *ptr::addr_of!((*self.as_ptr()).pid) }
>      }
>  
> -    /// Returns the UID of the given task.
> +    /// Returns the objective real UID of the given task.
>      #[inline]
>      pub fn uid(&self) -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: It's always safe to call `task_uid` on a valid task.
>          Kuid::from_raw(unsafe { bindings::task_uid(self.as_ptr()) })
>      }
>  
> -    /// Returns the effective UID of the given task.
> +    /// Returns the objective effective UID of the given task.
> +    ///
> +    /// You should probably not be using this; the effective UID is normally
> +    /// only relevant in subjective credentials.
>      #[inline]
>      pub fn euid(&self) -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: It's always safe to call `task_euid` on a valid task.
> @@ -363,7 +366,7 @@ unsafe fn dec_ref(obj: ptr::NonNull<Self>) {
>  }
>  
>  impl Kuid {
> -    /// Get the current euid.
> +    /// Get the current subjective euid.
>      #[inline]
>      pub fn current_euid() -> Kuid {
>          // SAFETY: Just an FFI call.
>
> ---
> base-commit: 192c0159402e6bfbe13de6f8379546943297783d
> change-id: 20260212-rust-uid-f1b3a45c8084
>
> --  
> Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-13  8:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-12 18:00 Jann Horn
2026-02-13  8:20 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-02-13 13:44   ` Jann Horn
2026-02-13  8:52 ` Gary Guo [this message]
2026-02-13 14:43   ` Jann Horn
2026-02-13 16:21     ` Alice Ryhl
2026-02-13 21:12     ` Jann Horn

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