From: "Alexei Starovoitov" <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: "Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, <ast@kernel.org>,
<daniel@iogearbox.net>, <andrii@kernel.org>, <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
<matt@bobrowski.net>, <mic@digikod.net>,
<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, <brauner@kernel.org>,
<kees@kernel.org>, <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, <gnoack@google.com>,
<jack@suse.cz>, <song@kernel.org>, <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
<martin.lau@linux.dev>, <eddyz87@gmail.com>, <memxor@gmail.com>,
<jolsa@kernel.org>, <m@maowtm.org>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 12:33:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DLDL7KK3FZKU.17ADLLWJVXB5F@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aqTZdCz6JaoK16Fp@zenbox>
On Fri Sep 11, 2026 at 10:26 PM PDT, Justin Suess wrote:
>
> If fs/, mm/, drivers/, net/, are permitted to have kfuncs, then why not
> security/? kfuncs.rst doesn't seem to forbid this.
because fs, mm, net see the value in bpf. bpf helps these subsytems
to focus on their core technologies and moves policy decisions out of
kernel and into bpf.
while lsm people treat bpf as arch-enemy.
kfuncs are not stable. we keep refactoring them.
while lsm folks treat anything within *lsm* and *security* as stable apis.
So any kfunc where they have a say, will become a huge burden for further
bpf development.
> Where would you point me to?
landlock was designed for unprivileged users. bpf needs CAP_BPF.
There is a fundamental disconnect. If you can tolerate CAP_BPF then
just use bpf-lsm and implement whatever policy you need there.
If bpf-lsm is missing a feature we can fix that.
selinux/landlock shouldn't be calling into bpf
and bpf shouldn't be calling into selinux/landlock internals.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-12 19:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-09 19:37 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/15] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/15] lsm: Add the bprm_apply_policy_object LSM hook Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/15] lsm: Move the lsm_for_each_hook() macro to security/lsm.h Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 21:34 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-09 22:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 23:08 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-12 3:37 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-12 5:26 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-12 19:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2026-09-13 19:41 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-13 23:24 ` LSM boundaries. Was: " Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-14 0:10 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-14 2:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-14 0:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-14 2:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_acquire kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_apply_bprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-12 3:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-12 5:39 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/15] lsm: Document the LSM policy object interface Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/15] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the LSM policy object kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/15] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/15] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 12/15] landlock: Free rulesets after an RCU grace period Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 15/15] landlock: Document the BPF policy interface Justin Suess
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