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From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, miklos@szeredi.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, dhowells@redhat.com, hch@infradead.org,
	adilger@sun.com, mtk.manpages@gmail.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, drepper@gmail.com,
	jamie@shareable.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 resend] vfs: new O_NODE open flag
Date: Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:24:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <E1N64Ch-0003C6-Rn@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091105145054.11f36b35@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> (message from Alan Cox on Thu, 5 Nov 2009 14:50:54 +0000)

On Thu, 5 Nov 2009, Alan Cox wrote:
> The examples on the list are not entirely theoretical but based on
> accepted and normal behaviour for application programming and Unix
> security models -so they are a security bug, minor or otherwise.
> 
> Fortunately you can patch it by hand.

How do you patch it by hand?

> > And as for reopening O_NODE files with increased permission: that's
> > feature people actually expressed interest in, so it's hardly a
> > security hole, is it?
> 
> Its a very unexpected semantic particularly for a passed file handle.

All of this is about new and unexpected semantics.  I don't think
anything more needs to be done than document it in the manpage:

  "A file descriptor opened with O_NODE | O_NOACCESS may be used to
   re-open the same file later with increased permissions
   (e.g. O_RDWR) if the access mode allows.  This is true even if the
   permissions on the path leading up to the file would prevent it"

> > > Wrong way around. The defailt should be that O_NODE fails for any handle
> > > which has not specifically added support.
> > 
> > Why?  O_NODE can be nicely implemented without any filesystem support.
> 
> So that you audit the behaviour for unexpected surprises as you go. And
> in most filesystem cases that consists of "dum de dum, nothing to see,
> add default handler, tick".
> 
> But that isn't the case for some things - consider CIFS and other network
> file systems.

Why?

Why would the server need to know anything about that?  O_NODE is
similar to a chdir() in this respect, and chdir doesn't have a handler
either.

> > > You also need to address the open with no permissions pinning a removable
> > > device question.
> > 
> > The whole point of O_NODE is that it doesn't do that, it only goes as
> > far as the mnt/dentry for the filesystem node and not further.  It
> > does not get to touch the device at all, so it can't pin it or have
> > any other side effect.
> 
> You have a reference to the mnt/dentry pinned so how will you unmount the
> volume ?

Oh, I see what you are getting at.  So the situation is this: the root
of the volume does not allow any access to the user, so normal
open/chdir won't work.  Yet open(O_NODE) will and so user can pin the
volume.

However, there's not all that much difference between the above and
doing "stat()" on the mountpoint in a tight loop, except the former is
a more reliable way to prevent unmounting.

I don't see this as a huge issue, but ideas about handling it better
are welcome.

Thanks,
Miklos

  reply	other threads:[~2009-11-05 15:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-11-05 11:23 Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 13:15 ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 14:27   ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 14:50     ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 15:24       ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2009-11-05 15:56         ` Alan Cox
2009-11-05 16:52           ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-05 18:25             ` Alan Cox
2009-11-06 11:10               ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-06  1:40         ` Jamie Lokier
2009-11-06 11:31           ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-06 14:17     ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-06 20:55       ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-07  7:49         ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 11:09           ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-07 11:31             ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 11:48               ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-08 17:01                 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-16 11:50                   ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-07 17:58               ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-09  8:58         ` Pavel Machek

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