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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Hemanth Selam <hemanth.selam@gmail.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/14] x86: fix repeated words in comments
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 13:42:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <F3B12E57-8FD9-4B68-8565-F643AFE0CEFE@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260907065816.27878-1-hemanth.selam@gmail.com>

On September 6, 2026 11:58:16 PM PDT, Hemanth Selam <hemanth.selam@gmail.com> wrote:
>Drop words accidentally written twice, reported by checkpatch.pl as a
>possible repeated word.  Only touches comments, no code changes.
>
>Assisted-by: Cursor:claude-opus-5
>Signed-off-by: Hemanth Selam <hemanth.selam@gmail.com>
>---
> arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S     | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c   | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
>index a45e1125fc6c..e0cda8bfee77 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
>+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
>@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
> 	 * The original userspace %rsp (RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)) is stored
> 	 * on the process stack which is not mapped to userspace and
> 	 * not readable after we SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.  Delay the CR3
>-	 * switch until after after the last reference to the process
>+	 * switch until after the last reference to the process
> 	 * stack.
> 	 *
> 	 * %r8/%r9 are zeroed before the sysret, thus safe to clobber.
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>index 2235a7477436..da4db3c709e2 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  * check hit.
>  * If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the
>  * case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to
>- * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one
>+ * distinguish an exception taken in user from one
>  * taken in the kernel.
>  */
> static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
>diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>index cb03f5a2b243..0f127a40f2f2 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> 		set_pmd(pmdp, entry);
> 		/*
> 		 * We had a write-protection fault here and changed the pmd
>-		 * to to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that,
>+		 * to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that,
> 		 * #PF is architecturally guaranteed to do that and in the
> 		 * worst-case we'll generate a spurious fault.
> 		 */
>@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ int pudp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> 		set_pud(pudp, entry);
> 		/*
> 		 * We had a write-protection fault here and changed the pud
>-		 * to to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that,
>+		 * to more permissive. No need to flush the TLB for that,
> 		 * #PF is architecturally guaranteed to do that and in the
> 		 * worst-case we'll generate a spurious fault.
> 		 */
>diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>index 14d9c7daf90f..213c5119d919 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Memory encryption is enabled but the SME enable bit for this
>-	 * CPU has has not been set.  It is safe to set it, so do so.
>+	 * CPU has not been set.  It is safe to set it, so do so.
> 	 */
> 	wrmsr
> .Ldone:

Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>

      reply	other threads:[~2026-09-07 20:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-07  6:58 Hemanth Selam
2026-09-07 20:42 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]

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