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From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: socket: fix a missing-check bug
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2018 20:21:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <F93F08E0-9D18-4C1A-8214-8AEAC829B317@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1540051091-16604-1-git-send-email-wang6495@umn.edu>

Hi Wenwen,

On October 20, 2018 8:58:10 AM PDT, Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> wrote:
>In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command is firstly obtained from the
>user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc' through get_user() and saved to
>'ethcmd'.
>Then, 'ethcmd' is checked to see whether it is necessary to pre-process
>the
>ethool structure, because the structure ethtool_rxnfc is defined with
>padding, as mentioned in the comment. If yes, a user-space buffer
>'rxnfc'
>is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space() and then the data in the
>original buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is copied to 'rxnfc' through
>copy_in_user(),
>including the ioctl command. It is worth noting that after this copy,
>there
>is no check enforced on the copied ioctl command. That means it is
>possible
>that 'rxnfc->cmd' is different from 'ethcmd', because a malicious user
>can
>race to modify the ioctl command in 'compat_rxnfc' between these two
>copies. Eventually, the ioctl command in 'rxnfc' will be used in
>dev_ethtool(). This can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and
>introduce potential security risk.
>
>This patch avoids the above issue by rewriting 'rxnfc->cmd' using
>'ethcmd'
>after copy_in_user().
>
>Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>

Assuming these issues are found with some kind of automated analysis, can you also add in your work flow to provide a Fixes: tag such that this could be backported to stable kernels?

If this is found by a tool is this something that is open source and somehow available? I would also make it clear that these issues are typically named time TOCTOU which might be clearer for people who review those patches.

Thanks!
-- 
Florian

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-21  3:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-20 15:58 Wenwen Wang
2018-10-21  3:21 ` Florian Fainelli [this message]
2018-10-29 18:53   ` Wenwen Wang
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-10-18 14:36 Wenwen Wang
2018-10-18 23:43 ` David Miller

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