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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RFC] security: revalidate rw permissions for sys_splice and  sys_vmsplice
Date: Wed, 30 May 2007 14:29:09 -0400 (EDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Line.LNX.4.64.0705301425570.17724@d.namei> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070530111743.e638c841.akpm@linux-foundation.org>

On Wed, 30 May 2007, Andrew Morton wrote:

> On Wed, 30 May 2007 09:15:01 +0200
> Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, May 29 2007, James Morris wrote:
> > > Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case 
> > > security policy has changed since the files were opened.
> > 
> > I guess it was inevitably going to happen :-)
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
> > 
> 
> Probably acked-by was more appropriate.
> 
> James, is this considered needed-for-2.6.22?

No, it's tightening things up.  We don't have full revocation in any case, 
and the primary security check is performed on open.

> > +	ret = security_file_permission(out, MAY_WRITE);
> > +	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> > +		return ret;
> 
> 
> ot: all the unlikely()s are irksome.  I wonder if there was some way of
> doing this in security_file_permission() instead.  eg:

This is the only place where we do this -- it's to remain consistent with 
the surrounding splice code, which does this for other checks.  Given that 
it's calling out to a typically non-trivial security module, it may be 
better to remove the unlikelys here.



- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

      reply	other threads:[~2007-05-30 18:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-05-29 20:22 James Morris
2007-05-30  7:15 ` Jens Axboe
2007-05-30 18:17   ` Andrew Morton
2007-05-30 18:29     ` James Morris [this message]

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