From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750783AbVHIVgO (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Aug 2005 17:36:14 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750812AbVHIVgO (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Aug 2005 17:36:14 -0400 Received: from mail-in-01.arcor-online.net ([151.189.21.41]:48026 "EHLO mail-in-01.arcor-online.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750783AbVHIVgN (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Aug 2005 17:36:13 -0400 Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2005 23:36:00 +0200 (CEST) From: Bodo Eggert <7eggert@gmx.de> To: Chris Wright cc: 7eggert@gmx.de, David Madore , Linux Kernel mailing-list Subject: Re: capabilities patch (v 0.1) In-Reply-To: <20050809205206.GW7762@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> Message-ID: References: <4zuQJ-20d-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <4zv0l-2b8-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <20050809205206.GW7762@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII X-be10.7eggert.dyndns.org-MailScanner-Information: See www.mailscanner.info for information X-be10.7eggert.dyndns.org-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-be10.7eggert.dyndns.org-MailScanner-From: 7eggert@web.de Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 9 Aug 2005, Chris Wright wrote: > * Bodo Eggert (harvested.in.lkml@7eggert.dyndns.org) wrote: > > Chris Wright wrote: > > > * David Madore (david.madore@ens.fr) wrote: > > >> * Second, a much more extensive change, the patch introduces a third > > >> set of capabilities for every process, the "bounding" set. Normally > > > > > > this is not a good idea. don't add more sets. if you really want to > > > work on this i'll give you all the patches that have been done thus far, > > > plus a set of tests that look at all the execve, ptrace, setuid type of > > > corner cases. > > > > How are you going to tell processes that may exec suid (or set-capability-) > > programs from those that aren't supposed to gain certain capabilities? > > typically you'd expect exec suid will reset to full caps. ACK, but 1) I wouldn't want an exploited service to gain any privileges, even by chaining userspace exploits (e.g. exec sendmail < exploitstring). For most services, I'd like CAP_EXEC being unset (but it doesn't exist). 2) There are environments (linux-vserver.org) which limit root to a subset of capabilities. I think they might use that feature, too. Off cause a simple "suid bit" == "all capabilities" scheme won't work there. -- "Just because you are paranoid, do'nt mean they're not after you." -- K.Cobain