From: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
To: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
Chris Vance <cvance@nai.com>, Wayne Salamon <wsalamon@nai.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
dgoeddel@trustedcs.com, Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>,
Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Subject: [PATCH] don't do pointless NULL checks and casts before kfree() in security/
Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2005 13:29:24 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.62.0503201316270.2501@dragon.hyggekrogen.localhost> (raw)
kfree() handles NULL pointers, so checking a pointer for NULL before
calling kfree() on it is pointless. kfree() takes a void* argument and
changing the type of a pointer before kfree()'ing it is equally pointless.
This patch removes the pointless checks for NULL and needless mucking
about with the pointer types before kfree() for all files in security/*
where I could locate such code.
The following files are modified by this patch:
security/keys/key.c
security/keys/user_defined.c
security/selinux/hooks.c
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
security/selinux/ss/services.c
(please keep me on CC if you reply)
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/keys/key.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/keys/key.c 2005-03-20 12:40:19.000000000 +0100
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t u
found:
atomic_inc(&user->usage);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
- if (candidate)
- kfree(candidate);
+ kfree(candidate);
out:
return user;
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/keys/user_defined.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/keys/user_defined.c 2005-03-20 12:41:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -182,9 +182,7 @@ static int user_match(const struct key *
*/
static void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data;
-
- kfree(upayload);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
} /* end user_destroy() */
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-03-20 12:44:43.000000000 +0100
@@ -1663,9 +1663,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (stru
static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
+ kfree(bprm->security);
bprm->security = NULL;
- kfree(bsec);
}
extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2005-03-20 12:46:11.000000000 +0100
@@ -951,8 +951,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
u32 sid;
/* remove any existing files */
- if (bool_pending_values)
- kfree(bool_pending_values);
+ kfree(bool_pending_values);
sel_remove_bools(dir);
@@ -997,10 +996,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
out:
free_page((unsigned long)page);
if (names) {
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- if (names[i])
- kfree(names[i]);
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+ kfree(names[i]);
kfree(names);
}
return ret;
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c 2005-03-02 08:37:49.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c 2005-03-20 12:47:16.000000000 +0100
@@ -166,16 +166,14 @@ static void cond_list_destroy(struct con
void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
{
- if (p->bool_val_to_struct != NULL)
- kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
}
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
{
- if (p->bool_val_to_struct)
- kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum**)
kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum*), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
@@ -185,8 +183,7 @@ int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policy
int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
- if (key)
- kfree(key);
+ kfree(key);
kfree(datum);
return 0;
}
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c 2005-03-20 12:59:28.000000000 +0100
@@ -590,17 +590,12 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
}
- for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
- if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
- kfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ kfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
- if (p->class_val_to_struct)
- kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
- if (p->role_val_to_struct)
- kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
- if (p->user_val_to_struct)
- kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
--- linux-2.6.11-mm4-orig/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2005-03-16 15:45:42.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.11-mm4/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2005-03-20 13:01:46.000000000 +0100
@@ -1703,11 +1703,9 @@ out:
err:
if (*names) {
for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
- if ((*names)[i])
- kfree((*names)[i]);
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
}
- if (*values)
- kfree(*values);
+ kfree(*values);
goto out;
}
next reply other threads:[~2005-03-20 12:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-03-20 12:29 Jesper Juhl [this message]
2005-03-20 12:50 ` Ralph Corderoy
2005-03-20 13:18 ` Jesper Juhl
2005-03-20 13:31 ` Ralph Corderoy
2005-03-20 14:04 ` YOSHIFUJI Hideaki / 吉藤英明
2005-03-20 14:39 ` Jesper Juhl
2005-03-21 10:17 ` Ralph Corderoy
2005-03-22 15:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-03-22 20:57 ` [PATCH] don't do pointless NULL checks and casts before kfree() in security/selinux/ Jesper Juhl
2005-03-22 15:34 ` [PATCH] don't do pointless NULL checks and casts before kfree() in security/ David Howells
2005-03-22 20:46 ` Jesper Juhl
[not found] <fa.p25ihnj.4026at@ifi.uio.no>
[not found] ` <fa.iqmuavi.o6kfai@ifi.uio.no>
2005-03-20 13:18 ` Bodo Eggert
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Pine.LNX.4.62.0503201316270.2501@dragon.hyggekrogen.localhost \
--to=juhl-lkml@dif.dk \
--cc=akpm@osdl.org \
--cc=cvance@nai.com \
--cc=dgoeddel@trustedcs.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jmorris@redhat.com \
--cc=kmacmillan@tresys.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mayerf@tresys.com \
--cc=sds@epoch.ncsc.mil \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=wsalamon@nai.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®