From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751878AbWFVTK2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Jun 2006 15:10:28 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751879AbWFVTK2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Jun 2006 15:10:28 -0400 Received: from mail1.sea5.speakeasy.net ([69.17.117.3]:5835 "EHLO mail1.sea5.speakeasy.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751878AbWFVTK1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Jun 2006 15:10:27 -0400 Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 15:10:24 -0400 (EDT) From: James Morris X-X-Sender: jmorris@d.namei To: "Serge E. Hallyn" cc: Andrew Morton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , David Quigley , Chris Wright , Christoph Lameter Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] SELinux: add security_task_movememory calls to mm code In-Reply-To: <20060622123102.GF27074@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> Message-ID: References: <20060622123102.GF27074@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 22 Jun 2006, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > sorry if I'm being dense - what is actually being protected against > here? The only thing I can think of is one process causing performance > degradation to another by moving it's memory further from it's cpu on a > NUMA machine. This is a privileged operation, which currently relies only on uid (i.e. traditional Unix DAC), and capability checking. SELinux introduces Mandatory Access Control (MAC) based upon all security-relevant attributes of tasks and objects, not just uid/capability checks. Theoretically, all processes could run with euid==0 under SELinux (in fact, Russell Coker's 'play box' does something similar by giving out the root password to everyone, although SELinux is designed to complement DAC, not replace it). Any privileged operations with DAC controls also need corresponding MAC controls, which is what this patch implements. - James -- James Morris