From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>,
Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Paul McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH-tip] sched: Don't call kfree() in do_set_cpus_allowed()
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 13:37:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3zCfQCpBu8aBy6O@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <601640d0-9dc2-a060-e165-c8efac54aa34@redhat.com>
On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 10:04:33AM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
>
> On 11/21/22 05:38, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 02:33:02PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
> > > Commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in
> > > do_set_cpus_allowed()") may call kfree() if user_cpus_ptr was previously
> > > set. Unfortunately, some of the callers of do_set_cpus_allowed()
> > 'some' ? There's only 3 or so, which one triggers this?
>
> It happenned at __kthread_bind_mask() where do_set_cpus_allowed() is called
> with pi_lock held.
>
> [ 1084.820105] <TASK>
> [ 1084.820110] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x81
> [ 1084.820117] check_noncircular+0x103/0x120
> [ 10[ 1084.820160] lock_acquire+0xba/0x230
> [ 1084.820164] ? kfree+0x10f/0x380
> [ 1084.820172] ? do_set_cpus_allowed+0x40/0x60
> [ 1084.820181] rt_spin_lock+0x27/0xe0
> [ 1084.820184] ? kfree+0x10f/0x380
> [ 1084.820188] kfree+0x10f/0x380
> [ 1084.820195] do_set_cpus_allowed+0x40/0x60
> [ 1084.820203] kthread_bind_mask+0x4a/0x70
> [ 1084.820211] create_worker+0xfb/0x1a0
> [ 1084.820220] worker_thread+0x2e3/0x3c0
> [ 1084.820226] ? process_one_work+0x450/0x450
> [ 1084.820230] kthread+0x111/0x130
> [ 1084.820236] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
> [ 1084.820244] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> [ 1084.820258] </TASK>
> [ 1084.820260] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
> kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
>
> It shows up with PREEMPT_RT kernel.
Oh, I see ..
> Maybe. One thing that I am not clear about is why user_cpus_ptr is set in
> the first place.
Perhaps someone set an affinity on kthreadd ?
But I'm thinking this exact problem is also possible (rather more likely
even) with select_fallback_rq() that too holds pi_lock (which account
for both other users of this function).
Bah.
And the allocation is just the one long in size (for small configs)
which is just enough space for a single linked list like you had.
Urgh.
The below is yuck too, and I'm not sure Paul wants us to use
kvfree_call_rcu() without its wrapper.
---
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 78b2d5cabcc5..0d0af0fc7fcf 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2606,7 +2606,12 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
};
__do_set_cpus_allowed(p, &ac);
- kfree(ac.user_mask);
+ /*
+ * Because this is called with p->pi_lock held, it is not possible
+ * to use kfree() here (when PREEMPT_RT=y), therefore punt to using
+ * kfree_rcu().
+ */
+ kvfree_call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)ac.user_mask, (rcu_callback_t)0);
}
int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
@@ -8196,7 +8201,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
struct affinity_context ac;
struct cpumask *user_mask;
struct task_struct *p;
- int retval;
+ int retval, size;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -8229,7 +8234,11 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
if (retval)
goto out_put_task;
- user_mask = kmalloc(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * See do_set_cpus_allowed() for the rcu_head usage.
+ */
+ size = max_t(int, cpumask_size(), sizeof(struct rcu_head));
+ user_mask = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user_mask) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put_task;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-22 12:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-18 19:33 Waiman Long
2022-11-21 10:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-21 15:04 ` Waiman Long
2022-11-22 12:37 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-11-22 15:23 ` Waiman Long
2022-11-22 16:33 ` Paul E. McKenney
2022-11-22 19:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-22 19:30 ` Waiman Long
2022-11-22 19:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
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