From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC845C4167B for ; Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:30:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1359154AbiBGP35 (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Feb 2022 10:29:57 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44008 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S243944AbiBGPW5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Feb 2022 10:22:57 -0500 Received: from zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk (zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk [IPv6:2607:5300:60:148a::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B0D6C0401C1; Mon, 7 Feb 2022 07:22:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from viro by zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk with local (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1nH5qx-000EH9-5j; Mon, 07 Feb 2022 15:22:55 +0000 Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 15:22:55 +0000 From: Al Viro To: Ari Sundholm Cc: Andrew Morton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Anton Altaparmakov Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/read_write.c: Fix a broken signed integer overflow check. Message-ID: References: <20220207120711.4070403-1-ari@tuxera.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: Al Viro Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 02:58:59PM +0000, Al Viro wrote: > On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 02:07:11PM +0200, Ari Sundholm wrote: > > The function generic_copy_file_checks() checks that the ends of the > > input and output file ranges do not overflow. Unfortunately, there is > > an issue with the check itself. > > > > Due to the integer promotion rules in C, the expressions > > (pos_in + count) and (pos_out + count) have an unsigned type because > > the count variable has the type uint64_t. Thus, in many cases where we > > should detect signed integer overflow to have occurred (and thus one or > > more of the ranges being invalid), the expressions will instead be > > interpreted as large unsigned integers. This means the check is broken. > > I must be slow this morning, but... which values of pos_in and count are > caught by your check, but not by the original? > > > - if (pos_in + count < pos_in || pos_out + count < pos_out) > > + if ((loff_t)(pos_in + count) < pos_in || > > + (loff_t)(pos_out + count) < pos_out) > > Example, please. Why do you need that comparison to be signed? Note that we explicitly truncate count so we won't get past the EOF of file_in right below that check and the check in generic_write_check_limits() truncates count so we won't get past ->s_maxbytes on the filesystem we are writing to. If both source and destination allow arbitrary offsets, we should not fail on copy that crosses from 2^63-1 to 2^63. Your variant will do just that. It's multiples of 2^64 that we should never attempt to cross, no matter what. IOW, what values of pos_in, pos_out, count, input file size and output filesystem file size limit do you think should be rejected with -EOVERFLOW here?