From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>,
"Mingwei Zhang" <mizhang@google.com>,
Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Track the number of TDP MMU pages, but not the actual pages
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 09:02:51 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YuMxuxgFpQdpmBBN@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YuGMQ/JJjuWxaUSu@google.com>
On Wed, Jul 27, 2022 at 07:04:35PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 27, 2022, Yan Zhao wrote:
> > On Sat, Jul 23, 2022 at 01:23:23AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > @@ -386,16 +385,18 @@ static void handle_changed_spte_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
> > > static void tdp_mmu_unlink_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
> > > bool shared)
> > > {
> > > + atomic64_dec(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages);
> > > +
> > > + if (!sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed)
> > > + return;
> > > +
> > Does this read of sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed also need to be protected by
> > tdp_mmu_pages_lock in shared path?
>
>
> No, because only one CPU can call tdp_mmu_unlink_sp() for a shadow page. E.g. in
> a shared walk, the SPTE is zapped atomically and only the CPU that "wins" gets to
> unlink the s[. The extra lock is needed to prevent list corruption, but the
> sp itself is thread safe.
>
> FWIW, even if that guarantee didn't hold, checking the flag outside of tdp_mmu_pages_lock
> is safe because false positives are ok. untrack_possible_nx_huge_page() checks that
> the shadow page is actually on the list, i.e. it's a nop if a different task unlinks
> the page first.
>
> False negatives need to be avoided, but nx_huge_page_disallowed is cleared only
> when untrack_possible_nx_huge_page() is guaranteed to be called, i.e. true false
> negatives can't occur.
>
> Hmm, but I think there's a missing smp_rmb(), which is needed to ensure
> nx_huge_page_disallowed is read after observing the shadow-present SPTE (that's
> being unlinked). I'll add that in the next version.
It makes sense. Thanks for such detailed explanation!
Thanks
Yan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-29 1:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-23 1:23 [PATCH v2 0/6] KVM: x86: Apply NX mitigation more precisely Sean Christopherson
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Tag disallowed NX huge pages even if they're not tracked Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 22:49 ` David Matlack
2022-07-25 23:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:45 ` David Matlack
2022-07-26 0:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-28 22:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Properly account NX huge page workaround for nonpaging MMUs Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:05 ` David Matlack
2022-07-25 23:08 ` David Matlack
2022-07-28 20:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Set disallowed_nx_huge_page in TDP MMU before setting SPTE Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:16 ` David Matlack
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Track the number of TDP MMU pages, but not the actual pages Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:21 ` David Matlack
2022-07-25 23:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-27 2:41 ` Yan Zhao
2022-07-27 19:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-29 1:02 ` Yan Zhao [this message]
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] KVM: x86/mmu: Add helper to convert SPTE value to its shadow page Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:23 ` David Matlack
2022-07-25 23:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-23 1:23 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] KVM: x86/mmu: explicitly check nx_hugepage in disallowed_hugepage_adjust() Sean Christopherson
2022-07-25 23:28 ` David Matlack
2022-07-26 5:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] KVM: x86: Apply NX mitigation more precisely Mingwei Zhang
2022-07-26 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-26 17:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-28 20:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-28 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-28 21:41 ` Mingwei Zhang
2022-07-28 22:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-07-28 22:15 ` Sean Christopherson
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