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From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] LSM patches for v6.1
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 10:42:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yz7pPxopFQyUyr28@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87h70h5d36.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>

Eric, there's one thing I don't get about why you hate LSM's having
the ability to prevent user name spaces, and yet you are OK with
(indeed, touting) /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces.

If we set max_user_namespaces to N, won't the N+1'th application get
an error when they try to create a user namespace?  One of your
arguments about why having LSM's forcing a error of say, EPERM, is
that applications that don't check for error returns might get
confused.  (Those are buggy applications; so they should be fixed ---
isn't that your argument about why we shouldn't be freaking out over
security bugs caused by kernel bugs and user namespaces.)  But if you
set max_user_namespaces, that same application will now fail with say,
ENOSPC.

And if in fact there is a buggy application that will create a
security exposure because they aren't checking !@#@?! error returns,
an attacker can simply create N user namespaces --- and then trigger
the buggy applicaion, at which point, they will have 0wned the system.

    	  	      	       	      - Ted

  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-06 14:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-03 22:37 Paul Moore
2022-10-04  1:03 ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-10-04 20:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-04 20:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-10-04 21:30     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-10-05 12:59       ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-05 12:38     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-05 13:38       ` Paul Moore
2022-10-05 15:32         ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-05 16:04           ` Paul Moore
2022-10-05 21:27             ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-05 22:39               ` Paul Moore
2022-10-05 18:54       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-10-06 12:52         ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-06 14:42           ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2022-10-06  8:29     ` Vegard Nossum

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