From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 638B286333; Wed, 8 Jan 2025 19:17:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1736363823; cv=none; b=GWPUV3n+kPe+d95ujCsv79DkHlE/HPU0r732hqmtIevV8yKrIZP9tK9cWgUGTu79/n0FuePBR1XeMxArdo2nidmr8PP5Tn4eVKmLGgSC4UD4AcRnt/YyfsON4nsmggumebgtLEjXwYwn75dEm3m8LHFBYSubd8rD7QLEHgOA04A= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1736363823; c=relaxed/simple; bh=jGvUUgBb5r0pOAeKKtF/A/HSUQcWln1ioZSAjG0jdLw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=Zapxm+K25JKNf2bKtQgdJ//p9ihs98VG4pBQueUrxYbtITE34F0tss81hM5Cxo4jpuh9dCKFC0JaBmRShaJNEgr0S11JFKL5Z4B8VQ7veVzWklOA904ukPB9Z0nvp2N+7TAGspdaerqoRaV/qG3OXeZH8Yr4vJcf4IyelwPGJ48= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Ka14tEAR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Ka14tEAR" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B94FFC4CED3; Wed, 8 Jan 2025 19:17:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1736363823; bh=jGvUUgBb5r0pOAeKKtF/A/HSUQcWln1ioZSAjG0jdLw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Ka14tEARPZy8pKUUBKv0oDsbnzFUS6yul2vGTxMj6RF8/DzUJ+AgYL8V/sKjidwHc fqaJDfQC4W/S7hmbmzpmrNf6pHgvq88WD08IgTZkxcAFPwy3J+hhU3uyMRibC3puw1 Bs/7aZoCGD/ma/N3AAVxp5dovh+xzmubwrpqXqW8qNWhmQl2fKEc8M0h9ajDZxArhB hJwq+keCIJrLiNjWs5+Q7mu2DMlC1uf5bLjvNnrDsu9GRjCcxn7CaPf3VZQPg0m6qx ttbtma+lRRLROV6s30NT537B/kyDRh8NXTrQXuzIJJAWZ7/tEylHeucykSKH9JwGjP aAzfmszq4WjfQ== Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 11:17:01 -0800 From: Luis Chamberlain To: Kees Cook Cc: Petr Pavlu , Christophe Leroy , Sami Tolvanen , Daniel Gomez , linux-modules@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Mike Rapoport Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] module: Don't fail module loading when setting ro_after_init section RO failed Message-ID: References: <202501061610.203636A9C@keescook> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <202501061610.203636A9C@keescook> On Mon, Jan 06, 2025 at 04:13:29PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Jan 03, 2025 at 05:13:32PM +0100, Petr Pavlu wrote: > > On 12/5/24 20:46, Christophe Leroy wrote: > > > This series reworks module loading to avoid leaving the module in a > > > stale state when protecting ro_after_init section fails. > > > > > > Once module init has succeded it is too late to cancel loading. > > Is there at least a big WARN about the ro failing? That should let more > sensitive system owners react to the situation if it looks like an > active attack on memory protections. > > (And maybe we should set a TAINT flag, but perhaps this is too specific > a failure mode for that?) I don't see a taint flag too far fetched in value. I think its a sensible compromise, and may be useful for other future set_memory_*() failures. Luis