From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from norbury.hmeau.com (abb.hmeau.com [144.6.53.87]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B954E132133; Fri, 12 Jul 2024 23:56:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=144.6.53.87 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720828594; cv=none; b=SwtVnG38wlJvXaomgVtu7Enmkedlf8znKzmIKn0Ih833fKvESesCp/EwSDourLwgZXrvT0xyy0OAfBDezwX5wVkytJqbp5CHW08xEXA7Hq6dLXs2w0yGysDt/2NTqFO+J2eAU900EYsEtt3ukRTc9evqhWNsV52IMAqO64QUd1k= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720828594; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fJmqQadkjuCKEKTMCucxpfaXrsiC+Dv+QQEqQnIBCwU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=UABXF/ZI0mqJTM7JPpxHNcgRuSImb/sle5TYJqcmb5meEoiX7Qdo0j7LJ23ZGMbc/cyL53t4ZFKMeuFiVfBdtpFeZRw0ckScXEhzFQaxDg1IwL/mxw3k0GUh2kvW4WNZQ3WUXJC/BYIyz2jV4rXuCgTBnHiYz3m4eUO9JhwlC3o= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au; arc=none smtp.client-ip=144.6.53.87 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au Received: from gwarestrin.arnor.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.103.7]) by norbury.hmeau.com with smtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Debian)) id 1sSQ7C-001q3t-1x; Sat, 13 Jul 2024 09:55:51 +1000 Received: by gwarestrin.arnor.me.apana.org.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Sat, 13 Jul 2024 11:55:50 +1200 Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2024 11:55:50 +1200 From: Herbert Xu To: David Gstir Cc: "David S. Miller" , Shawn Guo , Sascha Hauer , Fabio Estevam , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Oberhollenzer , Richard Weinberger , Pengutronix Kernel Team , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sigma star Kernel Team , kernel test robot , Dan Carpenter Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: mxs-dcp: Ensure payload is zero when using key slot Message-ID: References: <20240703124958.45898-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240703124958.45898-1-david@sigma-star.at> On Wed, Jul 03, 2024 at 02:49:58PM +0200, David Gstir wrote: > We could leak stack memory through the payload field when running > AES with a key from one of the hardware's key slots. Fix this by > ensuring the payload field is set to 0 in such cases. > > This does not affect the common use case when the key is supplied > from main memory via the descriptor payload. > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir > Reported-by: kernel test robot > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202405270146.Y9tPoil8-lkp@intel.com/ > Fixes: 3d16af0b4cfa ("crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys") > --- > drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Patch applied. Thanks. -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt