From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
To: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>,
<netdev@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<lvc-project@linuxtesting.org>, <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ipsec v3] xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 08:27:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zw4Lak7LOwfW32NJ@gauss3.secunet.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241008090259.20785-1-p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
On Tue, Oct 08, 2024 at 02:02:58PM +0500, Petr Vaganov wrote:
> During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
>
> BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
...
>
> Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized
> Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000
> Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0
>
> CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
>
> Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
> data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
> Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
> data and should never be given directly to user-space.
>
> A similar issue was resolved in the commit
> 8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
>
> Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
> Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
Applied, thanks a lot!
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-15 6:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-08 9:02 Petr Vaganov
2024-10-08 11:05 ` Markus Elfring
2024-10-15 6:27 ` Steffen Klassert [this message]
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