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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/11] uprobes: Add support to optimize usdt probes on x86_64
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2024 18:18:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zz95aiWM5cN6MDED@J2N7QTR9R3.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEf4BzbXYrZLF+WGBvkSmKDCvVLuos-Ywx1xKqksdaYKySB-OQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 10:13:04PM -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 2:06 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > Yep, on arm64 we definitely can't patch in branches reliably; using BRK
> > (as we do today) is the only reliable option, and it *shouldn't* be
> > slower than a syscall.
> >
> > Looking around, we have a different latent issue with uprobes on arm64
> > in that only certain instructions can be modified while being
> > concurrently executed (in addition to the atomictiy of updating the
> 
> What does this mean for the application in practical terms? Will it
> crash? Or will there be some corruption? Just curious how this can
> manifest.

It can result in a variety of effects including crashes, corruption of
memory, registers, issuing random syscalls, etc.

The ARM ARM (ARM DDI 0487K.a [1]) says in section B2.2.5:

  Concurrent modification and execution of instructions can lead to the
  resulting instruction performing any behavior that can be achieved by
  executing any sequence of instructions that can be executed from the
  same Exception level [...]

Which is to say basically anything might happen, except that this can't
corrupt any state userspace cannot access, and cannot provide a
mechanism to escalate privilege to a higher exception level.

So that's potentially *very bad*, and we're just getting lucky that most
implementations don't happen to do that for most instructions, though
I'm fairly certain there are implementations out there which do exhibit
this behaviour (and it gets more likely as implementations get more
aggressive).

Mark.

[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/ka/?lang=en

  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-21 18:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-05 13:33 Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:33 ` [RFC perf/core 01/11] uprobes: Rename arch_uretprobe_trampoline function Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:33 ` [RFC perf/core 02/11] uprobes: Make copy_from_page global Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:40   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:41     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:33 ` [RFC perf/core 03/11] uprobes: Add len argument to uprobe_write_opcode Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:41   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:41     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:33 ` [RFC perf/core 04/11] uprobes: Add data argument to uprobe_write_opcode function Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:41   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:43     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:33 ` [RFC perf/core 05/11] uprobes: Add mapping for optimized uprobe trampolines Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 14:23   ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 16:33     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:44       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:44         ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-19  6:06           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-19  9:13             ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-19 15:15               ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-21  0:07               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-21 11:53                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-21 16:02                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-21 16:34                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-21 16:47                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-21 19:38                         ` Mark Rutland
2024-11-14 23:44   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:44     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-19  6:05       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-19 15:14         ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-21  0:10           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC perf/core 06/11] uprobes: Add uprobe syscall to speed up uprobe Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC perf/core 07/11] uprobes/x86: Add support to optimize uprobes Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:44   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:44     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-18  8:18   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2024-11-18  9:39     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC bpf-next 08/11] selftests/bpf: Use 5-byte nop for x86 usdt probes Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC bpf-next 09/11] selftests/bpf: Add usdt trigger bench Jiri Olsa
2024-11-14 23:40   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-16 21:45     ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-19  6:08       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC bpf-next 10/11] selftests/bpf: Add uprobe/usdt optimized test Jiri Olsa
2024-11-05 13:34 ` [RFC bpf-next 11/11] selftests/bpf: Add hit/attach/detach race optimized uprobe test Jiri Olsa
2024-11-17 11:49 ` [RFC 00/11] uprobes: Add support to optimize usdt probes on x86_64 Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-18  9:29   ` Jiri Olsa
2024-11-18 10:06   ` Mark Rutland
2024-11-19  6:13     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-21 18:18       ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2024-11-26 19:13         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-18  8:04 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2024-11-18  9:52   ` Jiri Olsa

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