From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"andrew.cooper3@citrix.com" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/18] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_INTEL is enabled
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 00:31:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a3e58e90a6b26019633afeef9162720ef39c5e03.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230310214232.806108-3-seanjc@google.com>
Hi Sean,
Thanks for copying me.
On Fri, 2023-03-10 at 13:42 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Expose the crash/reboot hooks used by KVM to do VMCLEAR+VMXOFF if and
> only if there's a potential in-tree user, KVM_INTEL.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h
> index 2551baec927d..33c8e911e0de 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h
> @@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type);
> #define MRR_BIOS 0
> #define MRR_APM 1
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
> typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void);
> extern crash_vmclear_fn __rcu *crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss;
> +#endif
> void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void);
>
> typedef void (*nmi_shootdown_cb)(int, struct pt_regs*);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index 299b970e5f82..6c0b1634b884 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -787,6 +787,7 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
> }
> #endif
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
> /*
> * This is used to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on the
> * processor. And when loading kvm_intel module, the
> @@ -807,6 +808,7 @@ static inline void cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(void)
> do_vmclear_operation();
> rcu_read_unlock();
> }
> +#endif
>
> /* This is the CPU performing the emergency shutdown work. */
> int crashing_cpu = -1;
> @@ -818,7 +820,9 @@ int crashing_cpu = -1;
> */
> void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
> {
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
> cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss();
> +#endif
>
> cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
In the changelog you mentioned to expose the *hooks* (plural) used to do
"VMCLEAR+VMXOFF" only when KVM_INTEL is on, but here only "VMCLEAR" is embraced
with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL. So either the changelog needs improvement, or the code
should be adjusted?
Personally, I think it's better to move VMXOFF part within CONFIG_KVM_INTEL too,
if you want to do this.
But I am not sure whether we want to do this (having CONFIG_KVM_INTEL around the
relevant code). In later patches, you mentioned the case of out-of-tree
hypervisor, for instance, below in the changelog of patch 04:
There's no need to attempt VMXOFF if KVM (or some other out-of-tree
hypervisor) isn't loaded/active...
This means we want to do handle VMCLEAR+VMXOFF in case of out-of-tree hypervisor
too. So, shouldn't the hooks always exist but not only available when KVM_INTEL
or KVM_AMD is on, so the out-of-tree hypervisor can register their callbacks?
> cpu_emergency_svm_disable();
> --
> 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-13 0:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-10 21:42 [PATCH v2 00/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_INTEL is enabled Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13 0:31 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2023-03-13 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14 1:19 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] x86/reboot: Harden virtualization hooks for emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13 8:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-03-13 17:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Handle VMXOFF in KVM's reboot callback Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Disable SVM during reboot via virt/KVM " Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13 0:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14 0:42 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-15 0:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-15 1:30 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86/reboot: Hoist "disable virt" helpers above "emergency reboot" path Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13 0:54 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 18:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14 0:50 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_vmx() in KVM VMX Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move VMXOFF helpers into " Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] KVM: SVM: Make KVM_AMD depend on CPU_SUP_AMD or CPU_SUP_HYGON Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_svm() into kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13 2:47 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14 0:17 ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] KVM: VMX: Ensure CPU is stable when probing basic VMX support Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move "disable SVM" helper into KVM SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] KVM: x86: Force kvm_rebooting=true during emergency reboot/crash Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] KVM: SVM: Use "standard" stgi() helper when disabling SVM Sean Christopherson
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