From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CF64C433FE for ; Tue, 1 Feb 2022 01:00:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231391AbiBABA4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Jan 2022 20:00:56 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41242 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229739AbiBABAz (ORCPT ); Mon, 31 Jan 2022 20:00:55 -0500 Received: from mx1.mailbun.net (unknown [IPv6:2602:fd37:1::100]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A70BC061714; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 17:00:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from [2607:fb90:d98b:8818:11f7:a587:ba64:9b06] (unknown [172.58.104.31]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: ariadne@dereferenced.org) by mx1.mailbun.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6562B11B603; Tue, 1 Feb 2022 01:00:52 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=dereferenced.org; s=mailbun; t=1643677254; bh=vofBEbGEYkBffGz+fe8oMsX9AmKbLrhXNYF6gYB9zA4=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References; b=LzXawNxn5sShsRjZW+L97R2qySoeFoZ1c/gI9uSjQh8Xhol10J66MwRGSZ14EYYIs 4Y6ftMOPBA7SJBTjzig0zQgHRwSa2HhAOpc0pituNUDGLz5mtUKFMGKlYivFfv9p2/ KoNaS7i6azgh9CRmUsj/hEHMoWkVuX8cPeF9Z/+A0LmVhwN6kFu6VcheLZBsczn5PF FsVm+9GMNlYm/FJO50IA09buR4sSZ0U20yF5MCHqKvvyHvD6wbl+3N6pfYsfQNBeol 0QNGHIIPfYo4uEYWw0zRa6xNiA/BEMFp0lTr2IeDEYwTb/HObU8drbCwuggQ96YEEv w+jVuOlhjNJtQ== Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 19:00:46 -0600 (CST) From: Ariadne Conill To: Kees Cook cc: Andrew Morton , Ariadne Conill , Michael Kerrisk , Matthew Wilcox , Christian Brauner , Rich Felker , Eric Biederman , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty In-Reply-To: <20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org> Message-ID: References: <20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, On Mon, 31 Jan 2022, Kees Cook wrote: > Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill: > > "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the > second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting > a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, > but it is not an explicit requirement[2]: > > The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is > associated with the process being started by one of the exec > functions. > ... > Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], > but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. > Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] > of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider. > > This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]." > > While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be > mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL > (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] > existing userspace programs. Yes, it's a shame this is the case, but we do what we have to do, I guess :) > > The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and > adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 > seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv. > > Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an > empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so > userspace has some notice about the change: > > process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added > > Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/ > [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html > [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 > [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt > [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 > [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0 > [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0 > [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ > > Reported-by: Ariadne Conill > Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk > Cc: Matthew Wilcox > Cc: Christian Brauner > Cc: Rich Felker > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Alexander Viro > Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook In terms of going with this approach as an alternative verses my original patch, Acked-by: Ariadne Conill Ariadne