From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752004AbXDGDkW (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Apr 2007 23:40:22 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752044AbXDGDkW (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Apr 2007 23:40:22 -0400 Received: from nz-out-0506.google.com ([64.233.162.224]:50649 "EHLO nz-out-0506.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751999AbXDGDkV (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 Apr 2007 23:40:21 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=VDDuFkp/kXPZUzodLUSbyAokKBfZkf42oPhV3W1B+noMGdgKEBRrtuE7HxKXvpZx4gQrlo0Zk0z4dQWHbvaWzNZnlOvRQ9vANSEx8+1FZuqdiGgYp8wqoYJne3GQIHQ/iOaFHoeWgGYGihvpF6dHj+zY5xaD1JxiziUibefF3NY= Message-ID: Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2007 22:40:20 -0500 From: "Eric Van Hensbergen" To: "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: Re: [patch 0/8] unprivileged mount syscall Cc: "Jan Engelhardt" , "Andrew Morton" , "Miklos Szeredi" , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, util-linux-ng@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <4616E459.1090409@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline References: <20070404183012.429274832@szeredi.hu> <20070406160238.f3178189.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <4616D4D4.6020405@zytor.com> <4616E459.1090409@zytor.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 4/6/07, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > Jan Engelhardt wrote: > > On Apr 6 2007 16:16, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > >>>> - users can use bind mounts without having to pre-configure them in > >>>> /etc/fstab > >>>> > >> This is by far the biggest concern I see. I think the security implication of > >> allowing anyone to do bind mounts are poorly understood. > > > > $ whoami > > miklos > > $ mount --bind / ~/down_under > > > > later that day: > > # userdel -r miklos > > > > Consider backups, for example. > This is the reason why enforcing private namespaces for user mounts makes sense. I think it catches many of these corner cases. -eric