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From: "Koenig, Christian" <Christian.Koenig@amd.com>
To: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"pv-drivers@vmware.com" <pv-drivers@vmware.com>,
	Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	"dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
Subject: Re: TTM huge page-faults WAS: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 12:03:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a4fad2e1-c64d-a237-c07a-f480fe1a3351@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <46a21ca5-a395-e644-9eed-77ea26fc871e@shipmail.org>

Am 11.09.19 um 17:08 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
> On 9/11/19 4:06 PM, Koenig, Christian wrote:
>> Am 11.09.19 um 12:10 schrieb Thomas Hellström (VMware):
>> [SNIP]
>>>>> The problem seen in TTM is that we want to be able to change the
>>>>> vm_page_prot from the fault handler, but it's problematic since we
>>>>> have the mmap_sem typically only in read mode. Hence the fake vma
>>>>> hack. From what I can tell it's reasonably well-behaved, since
>>>>> pte_modify() skips the bits TTM updates, so mprotect() and mremap()
>>>>> works OK. I think split_huge_pmd may run into trouble, but we don't
>>>>> support it (yet) with TTM.
>>>> Ah! I actually ran into this while implementing huge page support for
>>>> TTM and never figured out why that doesn't work. Dropped CPU huge page
>>>> support because of this.
>>> By incident, I got slightly sidetracked the other day and started
>>> looking at this as well. Got to the point where I figured out all the
>>> hairy alignment issues and actually got huge_fault() calls, but never
>>> implemented the handler. I think that's definitely something worth
>>> having. Not sure it will work for IO memory, though, (split_huge_pmd
>>> will just skip non-page-backed memory) but if we only support
>>> VM_SHARED (non COW) vmas there's no reason to split the huge pmds
>>> anyway. Definitely something we should have IMO.
>> Well our primary use case would be IO memory, cause system memory is
>> only optionally allocate as huge page but we nearly always allocate VRAM
>> in chunks of at least 2MB because we otherwise get a huge performance
>> penalty.
>
> But that system memory option is on by default, right? In any case, a 
> request for a huge_fault
> would probably need to check that there is actually an underlying 
> huge_page and otherwise fallback to ordinary faults.
>
> Another requirement would be for IO memory allocations to be 
> PMD_PAGE_SIZE aligned in the mappable aperture, to avoid fallbacks to 
> ordinary faults. Probably increasing fragmentation somewhat. (Seems 
> like pmd entries can only point to PMD_PAGE_SIZE aligned physical 
> addresses) Would that work for you?

Yeah, we do it this way anyway.

Regards,
Christian.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-24 12:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-05 10:35 [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 14:15   ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 15:21     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 15:24       ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-05 16:40         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 17:05         ` dma_mmap_fault discussion Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  6:32           ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-06  7:10             ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  7:20               ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  8:37                 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-10 16:11         ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-10 19:26           ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11  4:18             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-11  7:49               ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 18:03                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-12  8:29                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11  9:08             ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 10:10               ` TTM huge page-faults WAS: " Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 14:06                 ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 15:08                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-24 12:03                     ` Koenig, Christian [this message]
2019-09-05 15:59       ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 16:29         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] dma-mapping: Fix dma_pgprot() for unencrypted coherent pages Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 11:23 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:11   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:25     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)

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