From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sun, 4 Jun 2017 01:24:13 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a507374a-e1b9-de56-5d50-825c283111ca@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170603063354.GJ6365@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On 06/03/2017 02:33 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
>
>> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> +{
>> + struct file *file = bprm->file;
>> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
>> + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
>
> Bloody wonderful. Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
> somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
>
Good catch. How does this look:
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_lock(&file_inode->i_lock);
if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid))
reason1 = "directory not owned by user";
else if (inode->i_mode & 0002)
reason1 = "file in world-writable directory";
else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid))
reason1 = "file in group-writable directory";
else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002)
reason1 = "file is world-writable";
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&file_inode->i_lock);
and likewise for other places in the code?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-04 5:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-03 5:53 Matt Brown
2017-06-03 6:33 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04 5:24 ` Matt Brown [this message]
2017-06-04 5:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-04 12:43 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 6:51 ` Al Viro
2017-06-03 10:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-03 22:30 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 16:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-04 22:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-05 15:30 ` Alan Cox
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