From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
alyssa.milburn@intel.com, scott.d.constable@intel.com,
joao@overdrivepizza.com, jose.marchesi@oracle.com,
hjl.tools@gmail.com, ndesaulniers@google.com,
samitolvanen@google.com, nathan@kernel.org, ojeda@kernel.org,
kees@kernel.org, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/14] x86: BHI stubs
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 12:20:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a7912ce1-131e-4b30-bed4-2576441c6212@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001110310.GM5594@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On 01/10/2024 12:03 pm, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 30, 2024 at 03:38:48PM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 30, 2024 at 11:23:38PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 30/09/2024 10:30 pm, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 09:49:09PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>>> +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__bhi_args_0, SYM_L_LOCAL)
>>>>> + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
>>>>> + cmovne %r10, %rdi
>>>> IIUC, this works because if the "jz" in the CFI preamble mispredicts to
>>>> the __bhi_args_* code, "cmovne" will zero out the speculative value of
>>>> rdi.
>>>>
>>>> Why use %r10 instead of a literal $0? Also how do you know %r10 is 0?
>>> There's no encoding for CMOVcc which takes an $imm.
>> Ah.
>>
>>> %r10 is guaranteed zero after the FineIBT prologue
>> If the "jz" in the FineIBT prologue mispredicts, isn't %r10 non-zero by
>> definition?
> Since I just wrote the comment...
>
> * FineIBT-BHI:
> *
> * __cfi_foo:
> * endbr64
> * subl 0x12345678, %r10d
> * jz foo-1
> * ud2
> * foo-1:
> * call __bhi_args_XXX
> * foo+4:
> * ... code here ...
> * ret
> *
> * direct caller:
> * call foo+4
> *
> * indirect caller:
> * lea foo(%rip), %r11
> * ...
> * movl $0x12345678, %r10d
> * subl $16, %r11
A compiler would normally spell this:
lea foo-16(%rip), %r11
> * nop4
> * call *%r11
>
> And lets take a random bhi function:
>
> + .align 16
> +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__bhi_args_0_1, SYM_L_LOCAL)
> + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
> + cmovne %r10, %rdi
> + cmovne %r10, %rsi
> + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
> + ret
> + int3
>
> So the case you worry about is SUBL does *not* result in 0, but we
> speculate JZ true and end up in CALL, and do CMOVne.
>
> Since we speculated Z, we must then also not do the CMOV, so the value
> of R10 is irrelevant, it will not be used. The thing however is that
> CMOV will unconditionally put a store dependency on the target register
> (RDI, RSI in the above sequence) and as such any further speculative
> code trying to use those registers will stall.
How does that help?
The write dependency doesn't stop a dependent load from executing in the
shadow of a mispredicted branch.
This is why SLH forces the pointer to 0 on the bad speculation path.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 11:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-27 19:48 [PATCH 00/14] x86/ibt: FineIBT-BHI Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 01/14] x86/cfi: Wreck things Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 21:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 02/14] x86/boot: Mark start_secondary() with __noendbr Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 03/14] x86/alternative: Simplify callthunk patching Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:27 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 04/14] objtool/x86: Add .tail_call_sites Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-09 15:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-10 4:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 05/14] objtool: Rename the skylake hack to --direct-call Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 06/14] x86/traps: Prepare for ENDBR poison UD1 usage Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 07/14] x86/ibt: Clean up is_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28 0:04 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30 8:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 9:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 16:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30 20:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 08/14] x86/ibt: Clean up poison_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 09/14] x86/ibt: Implement IBT+ Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28 1:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30 8:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 17:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-05 10:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 10/14] x86/early_printk: Harden early_serial Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 11/14] llvm: kCFI pointer stuff Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:53 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30 8:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 16:59 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-10-01 10:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-02 16:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-10-30 6:29 ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-30 20:07 ` Constable, Scott D
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 12/14] x86: Hacks for hacked up llvm Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 13/14] x86: BHI stubs Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28 1:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 21:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 21:46 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 22:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-09-30 22:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 22:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-01 11:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-01 11:20 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2024-10-03 12:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-03 13:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-14 17:50 ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-14 21:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-21 15:06 ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-29 5:59 ` Joao Moreira
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 14/14] x86/fineibt: Add FineIBT+BHI mitigation Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28 1:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-28 5:45 ` Constable, Scott D
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