From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
To: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-35876: x86/mce: Make sure to grab mce_sysfs_mutex in set_bank()
Date: Thu, 23 May 2024 15:54:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a7bc8570-4001-43b6-902f-d45de27fcb02@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3eadcc8c-d302-4a70-a16f-604285c1257d@suse.com>
On 23/05/2024 12:24, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> On 19.05.24 г. 11:34 ч., Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> Description
>> ===========
>>
>> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>>
>> x86/mce: Make sure to grab mce_sysfs_mutex in set_bank()
>>
>> Modifying a MCA bank's MCA_CTL bits which control which error types to
>> be reported is done over
>>
>> /sys/devices/system/machinecheck/
>> ├── machinecheck0
>> │ ├── bank0
>> │ ├── bank1
>> │ ├── bank10
>> │ ├── bank11
>> ...
>>
>> sysfs nodes by writing the new bit mask of events to enable.
>>
>> When the write is accepted, the kernel deletes all current timers and
>> reinits all banks.
>>
>> Doing that in parallel can lead to initializing a timer which is already
>> armed and in the timer wheel, i.e., in use already:
>>
>> ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888063a28000 object
>> type: timer_list hint: mce_timer_fn+0x0/0x240
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:2642
>> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8120 at lib/debugobjects.c:514
>> debug_print_object+0x1a0/0x2a0 lib/debugobjects.c:514
>>
>> Fix that by grabbing the sysfs mutex as the rest of the MCA sysfs code
>> does.
>>
>> Reported by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
>> Reported by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
>>
>> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-35876 to this issue.
>
>
> I'd like to dispute the CVE for this issue. Those sysfs entries are
> owned by root and can only be written by it. There are innumerable ways
> in which root can corrupt/crash the state of the machine and I don't see
> why this is anything special.
I haven't looked at the issue in detail but it sounds like this
potentially breaks lockdown (which is arguably a security feature) so
"requires root" to reach is not really an argument against this having a
CVE assigned.
Vegard
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-23 13:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024051943-CVE-2024-35876-d9b5@gregkh>
2024-05-23 10:24 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-23 13:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-23 13:54 ` Vegard Nossum [this message]
2024-05-23 13:58 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-05-23 14:54 ` Vegard Nossum
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=a7bc8570-4001-43b6-902f-d45de27fcb02@oracle.com \
--to=vegard.nossum@oracle.com \
--cc=cve@kernel.org \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®