From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "Christopherson,, Sean" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"andrew.cooper3@citrix.com" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: VMX: Skip VMCLEAR logic during emergency reboots if CR4.VMXE=0
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 22:20:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a95c1e35329999bef5d76c848accc66f24029f11.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZMARLNcPwovmOZvg@google.com>
On Tue, 2023-07-25 at 11:15 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2023, Kai Huang wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-07-21 at 13:18 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Bail from vmx_emergency_disable() without processing the list of loaded
> > > VMCSes if CR4.VMXE=0, i.e. if the CPU can't be post-VMXON. It should be
> > > impossible for the list to have entries if VMX is already disabled, and
> > > even if that invariant doesn't hold, VMCLEAR will #UD anyways, i.e.
> > > processing the list is pointless even if it somehow isn't empty.
> > >
> > > Assuming no existing KVM bugs, this should be a glorified nop. The
> > > primary motivation for the change is to avoid having code that looks like
> > > it does VMCLEAR, but then skips VMXON, which is nonsensical.
> > >
> > > Suggested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> > > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > > index 5d21931842a5..0ef5ede9cb7c 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > > @@ -773,12 +773,20 @@ static void vmx_emergency_disable(void)
> > >
> > > kvm_rebooting = true;
> > >
> > > + /*
> > > + * Note, CR4.VMXE can be _cleared_ in NMI context, but it can only be
> > > + * set in task context. If this races with VMX is disabled by an NMI,
> > > + * VMCLEAR and VMXOFF may #UD, but KVM will eat those faults due to
> > > + * kvm_rebooting set.
> > > + */
> >
> > I am not quite following this comment. IIUC this code path is only called from
> > NMI context in case of emergency VMX disable.
>
> The CPU that initiates the emergency reboot can invoke the callback from process
> context, only responding CPUs are guaranteed to be handled via NMI shootdown.
> E.g. `reboot -f` will reach this point synchronously.
>
> > How can it race with "VMX is disabled by an NMI"?
>
> Somewhat theoretically, a different CPU could panic() and do a shootdown of the
> CPU that is handling `reboot -f`.
Yeah this is the only case I can think of too.
Anyway, LGTM. Thanks for explaining.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-25 22:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-21 20:18 [PATCH v4 00/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] x86/reboot: Harden virtualization hooks for " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Handle VMXOFF in KVM's reboot callback Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 23:57 ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Disable SVM during reboot via virt/KVM " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 21:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-24 21:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] x86/reboot: Hoist "disable virt" helpers above "emergency reboot" path Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 23:57 ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_{INTEL,AMD} is enabled Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_vmx() in KVM VMX Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] x86/virt: KVM: Move VMXOFF helpers into " Sean Christopherson
2023-07-28 9:08 ` Xu Yilun
2023-07-28 9:43 ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: SVM: Make KVM_AMD depend on CPU_SUP_AMD or CPU_SUP_HYGON Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_svm() into kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 21:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-24 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 9:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-27 16:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-24 22:29 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2023-07-24 23:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: VMX: Ensure CPU is stable when probing basic VMX support Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] x86/virt: KVM: Move "disable SVM" helper into KVM SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: x86: Force kvm_rebooting=true during emergency reboot/crash Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: SVM: Use "standard" stgi() helper when disabling SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-07-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: VMX: Skip VMCLEAR logic during emergency reboots if CR4.VMXE=0 Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 3:51 ` Huang, Kai
2023-07-25 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 22:20 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2023-08-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=a95c1e35329999bef5d76c848accc66f24029f11.camel@intel.com \
--to=kai.huang@intel.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®