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From: Joey Jiao <quic_jiangenj@quicinc.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] kcov: x86: introduce CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 13:27:45 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aAco0cdikKNlbIEN@hu-jiangenj-sha.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANpmjNNmyXd9YkYSTpWrKRqBzJp5bBaEZEuZLHK9Tw-D6NDezQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Apr 17, 2025 at 09:43:20PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Apr 2025 at 10:55, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > The new config switches coverage instrumentation to using
> >   __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard)
> > instead of
> >   __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> >
> > Each callback receives a unique 32-bit guard variable residing in the
> > __sancov_guards section. Those guards can be used by kcov to deduplicate
> > the coverage on the fly.
> >
> > As a first step, we make the new instrumentation mode 1:1 compatible with
> > the old one.
> >
> > Cc: x86@kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     |  1 +
> >  include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 14 ++++++-
> >  include/linux/kcov.h              |  2 +
> >  kernel/kcov.c                     | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
> >  lib/Kconfig.debug                 | 16 ++++++++
> >  scripts/Makefile.kcov             |  4 ++
> >  scripts/module.lds.S              | 23 ++++++++++++
> >  tools/objtool/check.c             |  1 +
> >  8 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > index 0deb4887d6e96..2acfbbde33820 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > @@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ SECTIONS
> >                 . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
> >                 __bss_stop = .;
> >         }
> > +       SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS
> 
> Right now this will be broken on other architectures, right?
I did a test on arm64, after adding SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS, it reports
missing support for R_AARCH64_ADR_GOT_PAGE and
R_AARCH64_LD64_GOT_LO12_NC.
> 
> >         /*
> >          * The memory occupied from _text to here, __end_of_kernel_reserve, is
> > diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > index 0d5b186abee86..3ff150f152737 100644
> > --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@
> >   * sections to be brought in with rodata.
> >   */
> >  #if defined(CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION) || defined(CONFIG_LTO_CLANG) || \
> > -defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)
> > +       defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG) || \
> > +       defined(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS)
> >  #define TEXT_MAIN .text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*
> >  #else
> >  #define TEXT_MAIN .text
> > @@ -121,6 +122,17 @@ defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)
> >  #define SBSS_MAIN .sbss
> >  #endif
> >
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS)
> > +#define SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS                      \
> > +       __sancov_guards(NOLOAD) : {             \
> > +               __start___sancov_guards = .;    \
> > +               *(__sancov_guards);             \
> > +               __stop___sancov_guards = .;     \
> > +       }
> > +#else
> > +#define SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS
> > +#endif
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * GCC 4.5 and later have a 32 bytes section alignment for structures.
> >   * Except GCC 4.9, that feels the need to align on 64 bytes.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kcov.h b/include/linux/kcov.h
> > index e1f7d793c1cb3..7ec2669362fd1 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kcov.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kcov.h
> > @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ typedef unsigned long long kcov_u64;
> >  #endif
> >
> >  void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void);
> > +void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard);
> > +void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init(uint32_t *start, uint32_t *stop);
> >  void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2);
> >  void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2);
> >  void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2);
> > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > index 8fcbca236bec5..b97f429d17436 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > @@ -193,27 +193,15 @@ static notrace unsigned long canonicalize_ip(unsigned long ip)
> >         return ip;
> >  }
> >
> > -/*
> > - * Entry point from instrumented code.
> > - * This is called once per basic-block/edge.
> > - */
> > -void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > +static void sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(unsigned long *area, int size,
> 
> notrace is missing.
> 
> Can we give this a more descriptive name? E.g. "kcov_append" ?
> 
> > +                                          unsigned long ip)
> >  {
> > -       struct task_struct *t;
> > -       unsigned long *area;
> > -       unsigned long ip = canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_);
> > -       unsigned long pos;
> > -
> > -       t = current;
> > -       if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, t))
> > -               return;
> > -
> > -       area = t->kcov_state.s.area;
> >         /* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
> > -       pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> > -       if (likely(pos < t->kcov_state.s.size)) {
> > -               /* Previously we write pc before updating pos. However, some
> > -                * early interrupt code could bypass check_kcov_mode() check
> > +       unsigned long pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> > +
> > +       if (likely(pos < size)) {
> > +               /*
> > +                * Some early interrupt code could bypass check_kcov_mode() check
> >                  * and invoke __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). If such interrupt is
> >                  * raised between writing pc and updating pos, the pc could be
> >                  * overitten by the recursive __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
> > @@ -224,7 +212,40 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> >                 area[pos] = ip;
> >         }
> >  }
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Entry point from instrumented code.
> > + * This is called once per basic-block/edge.
> > + */
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> 
> Negation makes it harder to read - just #ifdef, and swap the branches below.
> 
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > +{
> > +       if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, current))
> > +               return;
> > +
> > +       sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(current->kcov_state.s.area,
> > +                                      current->kcov_state.s.size,
> > +                                      canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_));
> > +}
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
> > +#else
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard)
> > +{
> > +       if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, current))
> > +               return;
> > +
> > +       sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(current->kcov_state.s.area,
> > +                                      current->kcov_state.s.size,
> > +                                      canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_));
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard);
> > +
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init(uint32_t *start,
> > +                                                uint32_t *stop)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init);
> > +#endif
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
> >  static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> > @@ -252,7 +273,7 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> >         start_index = 1 + count * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP;
> >         end_pos = (start_index + KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP) * sizeof(u64);
> >         if (likely(end_pos <= max_pos)) {
> > -               /* See comment in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). */
> > +               /* See comment in sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(). */
> >                 WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
> >                 barrier();
> >                 area[start_index] = type;
> > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > index 35796c290ca35..a81d086b8e1ff 100644
> > --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > @@ -2135,6 +2135,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KCOV
> >  config CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC
> >         def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc)
> >
> > +config CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD
> > +       def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard)
> >
> >  config KCOV
> >         bool "Code coverage for fuzzing"
> > @@ -2151,6 +2153,20 @@ config KCOV
> >
> >           For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst.
> >
> > +config KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> 
> The "ENABLE" here seems redundant.
> Just KCOV_GUARDS should be clear enough.
> 
> > +       depends on KCOV
> > +       depends on CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD
> > +       bool "Use fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard for kcov"
> 
> The compiler option is an implementation detail - it might be more
> helpful to have this say "Use coverage guards for kcov".
> 
> > +       help
> > +         Use coverage guards instrumentation for kcov, passing
> > +         -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard to the compiler.
> > +
> > +         Every coverage callback is associated with a global variable that
> > +         allows to efficiently deduplicate coverage at collection time.
> > +
> > +         This comes at a cost of increased binary size (4 bytes of .bss
> > +         per basic block, plus 1-2 instructions to pass an extra parameter).
> > +
> >  config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
> >         bool "Enable comparison operands collection by KCOV"
> >         depends on KCOV
> > diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kcov b/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > index 67e8cfe3474b7..ec63d471d5773 100644
> > --- a/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
> >  # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS),y)
> > +kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD) += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard
> 
> This can just be kcov-flags-y, because CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> implies CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD.
> 
> > +else
> >  kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC)    += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc
> > +endif
> >  kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS)   += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp
> >  kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV)         += -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.so
> >
> > diff --git a/scripts/module.lds.S b/scripts/module.lds.S
> > index 450f1088d5fd3..ec7e9247f8de6 100644
> > --- a/scripts/module.lds.S
> > +++ b/scripts/module.lds.S
> > @@ -64,6 +64,29 @@ SECTIONS {
> >                 MOD_CODETAG_SECTIONS()
> >         }
> >  #endif
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> > +       __sancov_guards(NOLOAD) : {
> > +               __start___sancov_guards = .;
> > +               *(__sancov_guards);
> > +               __stop___sancov_guards = .;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       .text : {
> > +               *(.text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > +               *(.text..L*)
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       .init.text : {
> > +               *(.init.text .init.text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > +               *(.init.text..L*)
> > +       }
> > +       .exit.text : {
> > +               *(.exit.text .exit.text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > +               *(.exit.text..L*)
> > +       }
> > +#endif
> > +
> >         MOD_SEPARATE_CODETAG_SECTIONS()
> >  }
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > index ce973d9d8e6d8..a5db690dd2def 100644
> > --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> > +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > @@ -1149,6 +1149,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> >         "write_comp_data",
> >         "check_kcov_mode",
> >         "__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc",
> > +       "__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard",
> >         "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1",
> >         "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2",
> >         "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4",
> > --
> > 2.49.0.604.gff1f9ca942-goog
> >

  reply	other threads:[~2025-04-22  5:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-16  8:54 [PATCH 0/7] RFC: coverage deduplication for KCOV Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 1/7] kcov: apply clang-format to kcov code Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-17 16:47   ` Marco Elver
2025-06-18 14:23     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 2/7] kcov: factor out struct kcov_state Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-17 16:42   ` Marco Elver
2025-06-18 17:41     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-06-25 16:36     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 3/7] kcov: x86: introduce CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-17 19:43   ` Marco Elver
2025-04-22  5:27     ` Joey Jiao [this message]
2025-04-24 13:58     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-24 14:03       ` Marco Elver
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 4/7] kcov: add `trace` and `trace_size` to `struct kcov_state` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 5/7] kcov: add ioctl(KCOV_UNIQUE_ENABLE) Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-22  9:29   ` Marco Elver
2025-04-23 13:08     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-23 13:16       ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-23 13:30   ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-30  2:21   ` Joey Jiao
2025-04-30  6:32     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86: objtool: add support for R_X86_64_REX_GOTPCRELX Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16 14:21   ` Uros Bizjak
2025-04-17 15:37     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-17 15:49       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-16  8:54 ` [PATCH 7/7] mm/kasan: define __asan_before_dynamic_init, __asan_after_dynamic_init Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-22  6:46   ` Marco Elver
2025-04-22  8:02     ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-16 10:52 ` [PATCH 0/7] RFC: coverage deduplication for KCOV Dmitry Vyukov
2025-04-17  4:04 ` Joey Jiao
2025-04-17 12:43   ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-04-17  8:13 ` Alexander Potapenko

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