From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2025-22029: exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2025 12:39:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aBH93qMAhgMEGDAY@tiehlicka> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025041655-CVE-2025-22029-349f@gregkh>
Based on a follow up update from Oleg[1] I would like to dispute this
CVE.
TL;DR version
: with or without this patch the "if (fs->in_exec)" check in copy_fs()
: can obviously hit the 1 -> 0 transition.
:
: This is harmless, but should be probably fixed just to avoid another report
: from KCSAN.
On Wed 16-04-25 16:12:00, Greg KH wrote:
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
>
> check_unsafe_exec() sets fs->in_exec under cred_guard_mutex, then execve()
> paths clear fs->in_exec lockless. This is fine if exec succeeds, but if it
> fails we have the following race:
>
> T1 sets fs->in_exec = 1, fails, drops cred_guard_mutex
>
> T2 sets fs->in_exec = 1
>
> T1 clears fs->in_exec
>
> T2 continues with fs->in_exec == 0
>
> Change fs/exec.c to clear fs->in_exec with cred_guard_mutex held.
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-22029 to this issue.
>
>
> Affected and fixed versions
> ===========================
>
> Fixed in 6.6.87 with commit 753a620a7f8e134b444f89fe90873234e894e21a
> Fixed in 6.12.23 with commit e2d8e7bd3314485e0b3b08380c659b3d1d67ed6a
> Fixed in 6.13.11 with commit a6b5070721503fb6021ebed51c925ffc66b1c5ab
> Fixed in 6.14.2 with commit b519f2e5800fe2391b7545ba6889df795828e885
> Fixed in 6.15-rc1 with commit af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0
>
> Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
> kernel versions by the kernel community.
>
> Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
> older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
> https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-22029
> will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
> up to date information about this issue.
>
>
> Affected files
> ==============
>
> The file(s) affected by this issue are:
> fs/exec.c
>
>
> Mitigation
> ==========
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
> stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
> changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
> release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
> supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
> the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
> issue can be found at these commits:
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/753a620a7f8e134b444f89fe90873234e894e21a
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d8e7bd3314485e0b3b08380c659b3d1d67ed6a
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6b5070721503fb6021ebed51c925ffc66b1c5ab
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b519f2e5800fe2391b7545ba6889df795828e885
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
next parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-30 10:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2025041655-CVE-2025-22029-349f@gregkh>
2025-04-30 10:39 ` Michal Hocko [this message]
2025-04-30 10:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-04-30 11:20 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-05-01 14:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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