From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD51430499C for ; Tue, 16 Sep 2025 10:30:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1758018632; cv=none; b=Z9I30qGzgDpTXDgfPhX4ldbKQF8KFx6GkOuH8VA4l52osSNWWyj9humxXGAuHQ2Y8bmQ39A0/Sw3AK2abEJIh33gsavCxIw3RPWFWmXCn0jsiMghuz6EMkyZkamsT52B7qavmngeq4tqrQapbaWyU8eJAGu2yRHy4aW8VfOLJiM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1758018632; c=relaxed/simple; bh=SAAJtRVKcJwiJyR3IHIUauj/vRpTKvM8j3kpPYHSy0E=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=FAy6GLSEcQ5dL503si161n77B+K7+Jx1Tggfx/t/07xS/2ve6TJJktAhI4Z/t+7wzU3DZaTKfe/Frcg+MQQr9QUqMsceqhk3G/oFH6eSN9wMtI7hYPmLsFWrXQLqdVF1pE6kYgcNntZBWY6R9oNV5yjyomK3AUQv6CFtGI+7lY4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=BHb+dGdy; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="BHb+dGdy" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B7148C4CEEB; Tue, 16 Sep 2025 10:30:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1758018632; bh=SAAJtRVKcJwiJyR3IHIUauj/vRpTKvM8j3kpPYHSy0E=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=BHb+dGdyRn7Zj3bk8i+PMkTmR3IvnW/TifXFm9rRvMPO/ZaO5pXce+RHUf/AYLN5m ZFjrymyO4KJP39QuuWUan4ZWhzUkqkwGi9L4zGjQ69ZuV4LvnnIIwSrNtKWLRNpY/e 9Xd2t3xgqXbIMDet89oXA17Hz7dxpGgF4MThYHz82vFlVmkJjQdOqewWp9Z9wFJ54n pnXV10t8OJNalk/7VJZnza0DYdlBgPBtnX0op5oV7wN8o5GrSxX4PYJarBoQ7GnYIE Y64YxNdJWhIDL6bVgnejuGZKtkQxB5z2PPwj9vNUeEMpXwlAu/yx+9N3bKoHMHLkeK HpbRHh1G/qxdQ== Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 11:30:26 +0100 From: Will Deacon To: Dev Jain Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, anshuman.khandual@arm.com, quic_zhenhuah@quicinc.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, kevin.brodsky@arm.com, yangyicong@hisilicon.com, joey.gouly@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, urezki@gmail.com, jthoughton@google.com Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v5] arm64: Enable vmalloc-huge with ptdump Message-ID: References: <20250723161827.15802-1-dev.jain@arm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20250723161827.15802-1-dev.jain@arm.com> Hi Dev, On Wed, Jul 23, 2025 at 09:48:27PM +0530, Dev Jain wrote: > @@ -1301,16 +1319,76 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr) > } > > table = pmd_offset(pudp, addr); > + > + /* > + * Our objective is to prevent ptdump from reading a PMD table which has > + * been freed. Assume that ptdump_walk_pgd() (call this thread T1) > + * executes completely on CPU1 and pud_free_pmd_page() (call this thread > + * T2) executes completely on CPU2. Let the region sandwiched by the > + * mmap_write_lock/unlock in T1 be called CS (the critical section). > + * > + * Claim: The CS of T1 will never operate on a freed PMD table. > + * > + * Proof: > + * > + * Case 1: The static branch is visible to T2. > + * > + * Case 1 (a): T1 acquires the lock before T2 can. > + * T2 will block until T1 drops the lock, so pmd_free() will only be > + * executed after T1 exits CS. > + * > + * Case 1 (b): T2 acquires the lock before T1 can. > + * The sequence of barriers issued in __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable() > + * ensures that an empty PUD (via pud_clear()) is visible to T1 before > + * T1 can enter CS, therefore it is impossible for the CS to get hold > + * of the address of the isolated PMD table. > + * > + * Case 2: The static branch is not visible to T2. > + * > + * Since static_branch_enable() (via dmb(ish)) and mmap_write_lock() > + * have acquire semantics, it is guaranteed that the static branch > + * will be visible to all CPUs before T1 can enter CS. The static > + * branch not being visible to T2 therefore guarantees that T1 has > + * not yet entered CS .... (i) > + * The sequence of barriers via __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable() in T2 > + * implies that if the invisibility of the static branch has been > + * observed by T2 (i.e static_branch_unlikely() is observed as false), > + * then all CPUs will have observed an empty PUD ... (ii) > + * Combining (i) and (ii), we conclude that T1 observes an empty PUD > + * before entering CS => it is impossible for the CS to get hold of > + * the address of the isolated PMD table. Q.E.D > + * > + * We have proven that the claim is true on the assumption that > + * there is no context switch for T1 and T2. Note that the reasoning > + * of the proof uses barriers operating on the inner shareable domain, > + * which means that they will affect all CPUs, and also a context switch > + * will insert extra barriers into the code paths => the claim will > + * stand true even if we drop the assumption. > + * > + * It is also worth reasoning whether something can go wrong via > + * pud_free_pmd_page() -> __pmd_free_pte_page(), since the latter > + * will be called locklessly on this code path. > + * > + * For Case 1 (a), T2 will block until CS is finished, so we are safe. > + * For Case 1 (b) and Case 2, the PMD table will be isolated before > + * T1 can enter CS, therefore it is safe for T2 to operate on the > + * PMD table locklessly. > + */ Although I can see that you put a lot of effort into this comment, I think we should just remove it. Instead, we should have a litmus test in the commit message and probably just some small comments here to explain e.g. why the mmap_read_lock() critical section is empty. I'm currently trying to put together a litmus test with James (cc'd) so maybe we can help you out with that part. In the meantime... > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c b/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c > index 421a5de806c6..65335c7ba482 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c > @@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ void note_page_flush(struct ptdump_state *pt_st) > note_page(pt_st, 0, -1, pte_val(pte_zero)); > } > > +static void arm64_ptdump_walk_pgd(struct ptdump_state *st, struct mm_struct *mm) > +{ > + static_branch_enable(&arm64_ptdump_lock_key); > + ptdump_walk_pgd(st, mm, NULL); > + static_branch_disable(&arm64_ptdump_lock_key); > +} What serialises the toggling of the static key here? For example, I can't see what prevents a kernel page-table dump running concurrently with a check_wx() and the key ending up in the wrong state. Either we need an additional lock or perhaps using static_branch_{inc,dec}() would work instead? I haven't thought too hard about that but it looks like we need _something_. Will