From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
To: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Daniil Tatianin <d-tatianin@yandex-team.ru>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH printk v1] printk: ringbuffer: Fix data block max size check
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2025 16:15:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aNaf756eQ6qZCmCV@pathway.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250925224959.757266-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de>
On Fri 2025-09-26 00:55:59, John Ogness wrote:
> Currently data_check_size() limits data blocks to a maximum size of
> the full buffer minus an ID (long integer):
>
> max_size <= DATA_SIZE(data_ring) - sizeof(long)
>
> However, this is not an appropriate limit due to the nature of
> wrapping data blocks. For example, if a data block is larger than
> half the buffer:
>
> size = (DATA_SIZE(data_ring) / 2) + 8
>
> and begins exactly in the middle of the buffer, then:
>
> - the data block will wrap
> - the ID will be stored at exactly half of the buffer
> - the record data begins at the beginning of the buffer
> - the record data ends 8 bytes _past_ exactly half of the buffer
>
> The record overwrites itself, i.e. needs more space than the full
> buffer!
>
> Luckily printk() is not vulnerable to this problem because
> truncate_msg() limits printk-messages to 1/4 of the ringbuffer.
> Indeed, by adjusting the printk_ringbuffer KUnit test, which does not
> use printk() and its truncate_msg() check, it is easy to see that the
> ringbuffer becomes corrupted for records larger than half the buffer
> size.
>
> The corruption occurs because data_push_tail() expects it will never
> be requested to push the tail beyond the head.
>
> Avoid this problem by adjusting data_check_size() to limit record
> sizes to half the buffer size. Also add WARN_ON_ONCE() before
> relevant data_push_tail() calls to validate that there are no such
> illegal requests. WARN_ON_ONCE() is used, rather than just adding
> extra checks to data_push_tail() because it is considered a bug to
> attempt such illegal actions.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aMLrGCQSyC8odlFZ@pathway.suse.cz
> Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Looks good to me:
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
The merge window for 6.18 is likely going to start the following week.
I thought about it and I am going to push it there even when
it is this close. The fix is pretty conservative. It gets a lot
of testing using the new kunit test. I am pretty confident
about it.
Best Regards,
Petr
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-26 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-25 22:49 John Ogness
2025-09-26 14:15 ` Petr Mladek [this message]
2025-09-26 14:31 ` Petr Mladek
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