From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] tools headers x86 cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 13:19:13 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aQYzAdKEjNo_M0OZ@x1> (raw)
tldr; Just FYI, I'm carrying this on the perf tools tree.
Full explanation:
There used to be no copies, with tools/ code using kernel headers
directly. From time to time tools/perf/ broke due to legitimate kernel
hacking. At some point Linus complained about such direct usage. Then we
adopted the current model.
See further details at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/tools/include/uapi/README
To pick the changes from:
e19c06219985f2be ("x86/cpufeatures: Add support for Assignable Bandwidth Monitoring Counters (ABMC)")
7b59c73fd611eae8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SNP Secure TSC")
3c7cb84145336721 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add a CPU feature bit for MSR immediate form instructions")
2f8f173413f1cbf5 ("x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation")
a508cec6e5215a3f ("x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug")
This causes these perf files to be rebuilt and brings some X86_FEATURE
that may be used by:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Please see tools/include/uapi/README for further details.
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 06fc0479a23f01e5..4091a776e37aaed6 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2) /* VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3) /* "sev_es" Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP (19*32+ 4) /* "sev_snp" Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC (19*32+ 8) /* SEV-SNP Secure TSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* Virtual TSC_AUX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* hardware-enforced cache coherency */
#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14) /* "debug_swap" SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
@@ -495,6 +496,9 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO (21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO (21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER (21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ABMC (21*32+15) /* Assignable Bandwidth Monitoring Counters */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM (21*32+16) /* MSR immediate form instructions */
/*
* BUG word(s)
@@ -551,4 +555,5 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG( 1*32+ 7) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG( 1*32+ 8) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
#define X86_BUG_TSA X86_BUG( 1*32+ 9) /* "tsa" CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
+#define X86_BUG_VMSCAPE X86_BUG( 1*32+10) /* "vmscape" CPU is affected by VMSCAPE attacks from guests */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--
2.51.0
reply other threads:[~2025-11-01 16:19 UTC|newest]
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