From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from abb.hmeau.com (abb.hmeau.com [180.181.231.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE98D33F8A6; Fri, 30 Jan 2026 05:10:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1769749860; cv=none; b=Im4Jg50nha00Gh8vohZ5sScinRaqmOR3GXShDJAV7wJnRMkQDpH7fiJWmV/G/jL2jH7N1rTeU5d792547d1yoxqvGaBNe09ijesTcLlPsRONxkCIG6U+sVvjrJLc+N0i6zPpq8LSUyYmgEvpKV5NFQR2TRC7U6s6PKXU803IEE0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1769749860; c=relaxed/simple; bh=SR9s5oRQ5MdP67G3f7qcWYmtiiNHB8IPJlrsxhRBAus=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=Gsv1En3nn/PxfMWYBn71ehQLQs0SRMmrnB4e2v56L0DcK2Y7m/EWHwGxnr//aJlhWNT5s8TBX01C6WscxAm/uyL7oBt7noZYCJJMazcwPDYPdRvg4jL3jF3tkHJddcMcPy+FUHgILjGUPJS0Nffh5LwEB2muvlUnJQPQZonjK78= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b=KbCMgdHg; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b="KbCMgdHg" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gondor.apana.org.au; s=h01; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:cc:to:subject:message-id:date: from:content-type:reply-to; bh=aTE635nylV+CsuYnB1QJnswo4PraDvGjNuU6gzG7dWA=; b=KbCMgdHgySXA2ZX3NPkCRe8v2caI9lk3v1POcWrwq2L2gi0EJwxlcFopoUPpSqW9VrAxpvYBX4L Qz+bYvXCi6qcFqTvNz0Ki0gafv0dEWbUK7f2mqVrr1UUU/1Hi2UPA6UA86ftBZtSL9F1ZiKviBcGW jr5YeIuSxCw0SqCUUc9cjUoDPu15btJoL6JrOSOQvV1vgsDR2mo8m4echVzb1xvG5MZWc9ny6NnZK oqifuhdR6H/y3fxsomtkIg1dMeACCBflZDBmcTpslf9Zy5ca+bOdsCl8rFSaOfoFIm7YGjyMjinN6 tmkSrE+bugwGvD4QNgXKaFwJ92jtutyO5frQ==; Received: from loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.167.2]) by formenos.hmeau.com with smtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Debian)) id 1vlgmQ-003DaK-2c; Fri, 30 Jan 2026 13:10:51 +0800 Received: by loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Fri, 30 Jan 2026 13:10:50 +0800 Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 13:10:50 +0800 From: Herbert Xu To: jeffbarnes@linux.microsoft.com Cc: "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Barnes Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: aead: add service indicator flag for RFC4106 AES-GCM Message-ID: References: <20260129-fips-gcm-clean-v1-v1-1-43e17dc20a1a@microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20260129-fips-gcm-clean-v1-v1-1-43e17dc20a1a@microsoft.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2026 at 04:04:36PM -0500, jeffbarnes@linux.microsoft.com wrote: > From: Jeff Barnes > > FIPS 140 validations require a “service indicator” to positively > identify when an approved cryptographic service is provided. For > RFC4106 AES‑GCM (used by IPsec), this commit exposes a per‑request > indicator bit when the IV/nonce construction meets the FIPS uniqueness > requirement. > > Specifically, the indicator is set when the caller uses the RFC4106 > construction with seqiv (per RFC 4106 §3), where the 32‑bit salt and > 64‑bit seqiv together guarantee a unique 96‑bit IV per key. This > meets the SP 800‑38D §8.2 uniqueness requirement for GCM. > > No ABI or uAPI changes. The flag is internal to the crypto API request > path and may be consumed by in‑tree callers that need to record service > use in a FIPS context. > > Tests: > - Verified that gcm(aes) requests never set the service‑indicator bit. > - Verified that rfc4106(gcm(aes)) requests consistently set the bit. > - Existing crypto self‑tests continue to pass. > - checkpatch.pl: no issues. > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnes Rather than exporting this indicator, I would prefer that we just forbid non-compliant combinations when FIPS mode is enabled. Thanks, -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt