From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data
Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 08:31:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aa69bd39-3574-ac5e-b63a-af4ab10b0018@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6442e1f7.620a0220.b44ce.7a42@mx.google.com>
On 4/21/2023 12:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 10:42:50AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
>> This will be used later for attribute reporting.
>>
>> Determine the number of possible security modules based on
>> their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
>> known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
>> to use the constant.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> Nit below...
>
>> [...]
>> @@ -513,6 +531,15 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> {
>> int i;
>>
>> + if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_COUNT)
>> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>> + /*
>> + * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
>> + * than once. Landlock is one such case.
>> + */
>> + if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid)
>> + lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
>> +
> I find this logic hard to parse. I think this might be better, since
> lsm_idlist will be entirely initialized to LSM_UNDEF, yes?
>
> /*
> * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
> * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization
> * is serialized. Landlock is one such case.
> */
> if (lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt] != lsmid)
> lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
This code won't do the job. lsm_active_count indexes the first unset
entry, not the last set entry.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-27 15:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230421174259.2458-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:20 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-27 15:31 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-04-23 8:04 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:21 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-26 1:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-22 13:12 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-22 16:59 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling an lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:49 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:54 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-22 1:23 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-22 14:55 ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 20:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-04-27 16:00 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aa69bd39-3574-ac5e-b63a-af4ab10b0018@schaufler-ca.com \
--to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®