From: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>
To: "James Houghton" <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david@kernel.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
"Pavel Begunkov" <asml.silence@gmail.com>,
"James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <mkp@kernel.org>,
"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
"Chris Mason" <mason@kernel.org>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>,
"Namhyung Kim" <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on user accesses when current->mm is NULL
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:32:08 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ac22215d-3e58-4aab-851e-47c30836e058@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADrL8HXQdzcroeGN-ACjyy-jSAdBNHiT1_BCVVe0P+Y8ZueiyA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Oct 27, 2026, at 18:29, James Houghton wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 at 5:13 PM Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>>
>> E.g. on arm64 with CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN, the page table base for
>> the current process is only set in user_access_begin() and would
>> not point to any task here. Without ttbr0_pan, it should be
>> covered by cpu_set_reserved_ttbr0() turning off all user space access
>> for kernel threads.
>>
>> Should this perhaps be addressed in architecture specific code
>> instead of in a common place?
>
> You're right that whether corruption can actually occur depends on the
> architecture and config. I'll write a note about this in the v2 cover
> letter.
>
> That being said, I still think the right thing to do is to have the
> new check(s) in common code. Instances of improper uaccesses are still
> bugs, even if no corruption occurs.
I agree we have to do something to prevent the problem for most
configurations and find any newly introduced bugs. The questions
that need to be properly decided are
- does there need to be any compile-time configuration to skip
the extra checks and/or the warnings?
- are there any cheaper ways to make it safe than to add a
condition on each user access?
E.g. the original lazy mm switch was intended to avoid
expensive TLB flushes when switching to a kernel thread and
back to the original task on 32-bit x86. On modern CPUs,
the MMU can deal with multiple ASIDs cheaply, so turning
off user access in a kernel thread may be cheaper than
adding code to uaccess depending on the architecture.
>> I would think that user_access_begin() is a more natural place
>> for the added checks, as this should be called exactly once for
>> any function that accesses user space and also stays out of the
>> way of the copy_from_kernel_nofault() etc.
>
> user_access_begin() isn't used in a lot of places that I want to
> catch, including the KVM case. Roughly:
>
> kvm_write_guest_cached() --> __copy_to_user() --> raw_copy_to_user()
>
> There's no user_access_begin() in there. :/
Good point, yes. After the changes described in
https://lwn.net/Articles/1102061/, I had assumed that all
__copy_{from,to}_user() are going from common code, but it looks
like the series so far only touches __{get,put}_user().
There are of course few enough of these left that I think
we can consider doing the same thing here and turn them all
into the checking version:
$ git grep -wl __copy_'\(from\|to\)'_user drivers mm virt
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem.c
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_query.c
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/atmel_usba_udc.c
drivers/vhost/scsi.c
drivers/vhost/vhost.c
mm/kasan/kasan_test_c.c
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
> I do think user_access_begin() should have the new check though, so
> I've added it in the v2.
I had the details confused here. Seing that user_access_begin()
and the other accessors always call access_ok() at some
point, maybe that would be enough?:
--- a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
+ if (WARN_ONCE(!current->mm))
+ return false;
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE) ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU))
return true;
(plus the few extra copies of access_ok()/__access_ok())
As a quick fix I would probably start with just the 'if (!mm) return false'
bit here to get something merged while we still discuss the other
details.
Arnd
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 18:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 21:52 James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 01/10] scsi: bsg: Don't copy sense data to user memory when canceled James Houghton
2026-10-27 2:41 ` Jens Axboe
2026-10-27 17:52 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 02/10] btrfs: Don't copy encoded read " James Houghton
2026-10-27 2:42 ` Jens Axboe
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 03/10] bpf: Fail sleepable user copy helpers when current->mm is NULL James Houghton
2026-10-26 22:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-27 18:50 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 04/10] stacktrace: Don't unwind the user stack without an mm James Houghton
2026-10-26 22:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-26 22:55 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 05/10] perf/core: " James Houghton
2026-10-27 11:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-27 17:45 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 06/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on user copies when current->mm is NULL James Houghton
2026-10-26 22:42 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-26 23:41 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 07/10] uaccess: Fail user nofault helpers quietly " James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 08/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on __copy_from_user_inatomic() without an mm James Houghton
2026-10-26 22:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-26 22:41 ` James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 09/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on more user accesses " James Houghton
2026-10-26 21:52 ` [RFC PATCH 10/10] uaccess: Move the NULL mm warning out of line James Houghton
2026-10-26 23:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2026-10-26 23:51 ` James Houghton
2026-10-27 0:12 ` [RFC PATCH 00/10] uaccess: Refuse and warn on user accesses when current->mm is NULL Arnd Bergmann
2026-10-27 10:33 ` Arnd Bergmann
2026-10-27 17:29 ` James Houghton
2026-10-27 18:32 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2026-10-27 21:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-10-27 23:17 ` James Houghton
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