From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
robin.murphy@arm.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, will@kernel.org,
maz@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, jiri@resnulli.us,
aneesh.kumar@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 12:34:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <acfded81-f04e-4be0-af98-6ed43b8409ec@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <acrgYotBExJhEJkK@google.com>
On 30/03/2026 21:43, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 12:06:54PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>> On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 02:50:39PM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
>>> In case a device have a restricted DMA pool, it will be decrypted
>>> by default.
>>>
>>> However, in the path of dma_direct_alloc() memory can be allocated
>>> from this pool using, __dma_direct_alloc_pages() =>
>>> dma_direct_alloc_swiotlb()
>>>
>>> After that from the same function, it will attempt to decrypt it
>>> using dma_set_decrypted() if force_dma_unencrypted().
>>>
>>> Which results in the memory being decrypted twice.
>>>
>>> It's not clear how the does realm world/hypervisors deal with that,
>>> for example:
>>> - CCA: Clear a bit in the page table and call realm IPA_STATE_SET.
>>> - TDX: Issue a hypercall.
>>> - pKVM: Which doesn't implement force_dma_unencrypted() at the moment,
>>> uses a share hypercall.
>>>
>>> Change that to only encrypt/decrypt memory that are not allocated
>>> from the restricted dma pools.
>>>
>>> Fixes: f4111e39a52a ("swiotlb: Add restricted DMA alloc/free support")
>>> Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/dma/direct.c | 4 ++--
>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c
>>> index 8f43a930716d..27d804f0473f 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c
>>> @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ bool dma_coherent_ok(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size)
>>>
>>> static int dma_set_decrypted(struct device *dev, void *vaddr, size_t size)
>>> {
>>> - if (!force_dma_unencrypted(dev))
>>> + if (!force_dma_unencrypted(dev) || is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev))
>>> return 0;
>>
>> This seems really obtuse, I would expect the decryption state of the
>> memory to be known by the caller. If dma_direct_alloc_swiotlb() can
>> return decrypted or encrypted memory it needs to return a flag saying
>> that. It shouldn't be deduced by checking dev flags in random places
>> like this.
>
> At the moment restricted dma is always decrypted, also it’s per device
> so we don’t have to check this per allocation.
Doesn't the initial state depend on platform ? For CCA, the Realm must
decide how it wants to use a given region, which for the restricted DMA
pool, it can be made decrypted. Could the VM OS decide to make this
decrypted at boot ?
Suzuki
> I can change the signature for __dma_direct_alloc_pages() to make it
> return an extra flag but that feels more complicated as it changes
> dma_direct_alloc_swiotlb() , swiotlb_alloc() with its callers.
>
> I can investigate this approach further.
>
> Thanks,
> Mostafa
>
>>
>> Double decryption is certainly a bug, I do not expect that to work.
>>
>> Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-31 11:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-30 14:50 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:43 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-31 11:34 ` Suzuki K Poulose [this message]
2026-03-31 12:50 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-13 6:00 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 12:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 15:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 16:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] dma-mapping: Use the correct phys_to_dma() for DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:47 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 6:08 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 20:27 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-16 6:50 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-16 8:35 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:49 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13 6:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 20:31 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] dma-mapping: Refactor memory encryption usage Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] dma-mapping: Add doc for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
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