From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>, pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>,
rkrcmar@redhat.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kvm: x86: mmu: Add cast to negated bitmasks in update_permission_bitmask()
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 10:23:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ad7a9addf043ee7fda8907eff9f83c9709b575dc.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKwvOdnhPCDRFMhYiAr2kSCDWrL_gaY8c6XHJ96PupcN-wcDpQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2018-06-19 at 10:08 -0700, Nick Desaulniers wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 8:19 AM Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 15/06/2018 20:45, Nick Desaulniers wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > In any case I think it it preferable to fix the code over disabling
> > > > > the warning, unless the warning is bogus or there are just too many
> > > > > occurrences.
> > > >
> > > > Maybe.
> > >
> > > Spurious warning today, actual bug tomorrow? I prefer to not to
> > > disable warnings wholesale. They don't need to find actual bugs to be
> > > useful. Flagging code that can be further specified does not hurt.
> > > Part of the effort to compile the kernel with different compilers is
> > > to add warning coverage, not remove it. That said, there may be
> > > warnings that are never useful (or at least due to some invariant that
> > > only affects the kernel). I cant think of any off the top of my head,
> > > but I'm also not sure this is one.
> >
> > This one really makes the code uglier though, so I'm not really inclined
> > to applying the patch.
>
> Note that of the three variables (w, u, x), only u is used later on.
> What about declaring them as negated with the cast, that way there's
> no cast in a ternary?
It'd be simpler to cast in the BYTE_MASK macro itself
Ex:
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> index d594690d8b95..53673ad4b295 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -4261,8 +4261,9 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct
> kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> {
> unsigned byte;
>
> - const u8 x = BYTE_MASK(ACC_EXEC_MASK);
> - const u8 w = BYTE_MASK(ACC_WRITE_MASK);
> + const u8 x_not = (u8)~BYTE_MASK(ACC_EXEC_MASK);
> + const u8 w_not = (u8)~BYTE_MASK(ACC_WRITE_MASK);
> + const u8 u_not = (u8)~BYTE_MASK(ACC_USER_MASK);
> const u8 u = BYTE_MASK(ACC_USER_MASK);
>
>
> bool cr4_smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP) != 0;
> @@ -4278,11 +4279,11 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct
> kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> */
>
> /* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
> - u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? ~w : 0;
> + u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? w_not : 0;
> /* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
> - u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? ~u : 0;
> + u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? u_not : 0;
> /* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
> - u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? ~x : 0;
> + u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? x_not : 0;
> /* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
> u8 smepf = 0;
> /* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */
>
>
> Maybe you have a better naming scheme than *_not ? What do you think?
It'd be nicer to cast in the BYTE_MASK macro
and using "unsigned byte;" is misleading at best.
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index d594690d8b95..201711aa99b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -4246,15 +4246,14 @@ reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, execonly);
}
-#define BYTE_MASK(access) \
- ((1 & (access) ? 2 : 0) | \
- (2 & (access) ? 4 : 0) | \
- (3 & (access) ? 8 : 0) | \
- (4 & (access) ? 16 : 0) | \
- (5 & (access) ? 32 : 0) | \
- (6 & (access) ? 64 : 0) | \
- (7 & (access) ? 128 : 0))
-
+#define BYTE_MASK(access) \
+ ((u8)(((access) & 1 ? 2 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 2 ? 4 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 3 ? 8 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 4 ? 16 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 5 ? 32 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 6 ? 64 : 0) | \
+ ((access) & 7 ? 128 : 0)))
static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-19 17:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-15 17:47 Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-15 18:04 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-06-15 18:18 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-15 18:29 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-15 18:40 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-15 18:45 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-06-19 15:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-06-19 17:08 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-06-19 17:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-06-19 18:38 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-19 17:23 ` Joe Perches [this message]
2018-06-19 17:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-06-19 18:07 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-19 18:36 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-19 19:11 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-19 21:10 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-19 21:55 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-19 23:45 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-20 0:18 ` Joe Perches
2018-06-20 1:36 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-20 8:02 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-06-20 23:00 ` Matthias Kaehlcke
2018-06-16 3:39 ` kbuild test robot
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