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Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 10:05:58 -0500 (CDT)
From: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
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To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Subject: Re: [RFC] capabilities: Ambient capabilities
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On Mon, 30 Mar 2015, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> > Would this suffice? It puts the CAP_SETPCAP limitation back to how it
> > was in my earlier patch.
> I really don't like that variant.  CAP_SETPCAP is dangerous and so
> absurdly powerful that people really shouldn't hand it out.

According to

	man 7 capabilities

CAP_SETPCAP is required to setup securebits.

This hides the functionality behind yet another stage of security and
obscures this ability somewhat more?