From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 12:36:33 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801281232130.2126@nanos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180128085500.djlm5rlbhjlpfj4i@gmail.com>
On Sun, 28 Jan 2018, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> > +
> > +#ifndef __NOSPEC_H__
> > +#define __NOSPEC_H__
_LINUX_NOSPEC_H
We have an established practice for those header guards...
> > +/*
> > + * When idx is out of bounds (idx >= sz), the sign bit will be set.
> > + * Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of zero
> > + * for an out of bounds idx, or ~0UL if within bounds [0, sz).
> > + */
> > +#ifndef array_idx_mask
> > +static inline unsigned long array_idx_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx usage.
> > + *
> > + * Even if the cpu speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
>
> s/cpu/CPU
>
> > + * sign bit of idx is taken into account when generating the
> > + * mask.
> > + *
> > + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
> > + * idx and sz are less than LONG_MAX.
>
> Please use 'idx' and 'sz' in quotes, to make sure they stand out more in free
> flowing comment text. Also please use '()' to denote functions/methods.
>
> I.e. something like:
>
> * Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx() usage.
> *
> * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE() branch, the
> * sign bit of 'idx' is taken into account when generating the
> * mask.
> *
> * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
> * 'idx' and 'sz' are less than LONG_MAX.
I rather prefer to have a proper kernel doc instead of the comment above
the function and then use @idx and @sz in the code comments.
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-28 11:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-27 19:26 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
[not found] ` <151703972396.26578.7326612698912543866.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 8:55 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 11:36 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-01-28 16:28 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 16:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 6:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 19:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 20:13 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 20:27 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 8:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-31 14:13 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 14:21 ` Greg KH
[not found] ` <151703972912.26578.6792656143278523491.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 9:02 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <151703973427.26578.15693075353773519333.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 9:14 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 20:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <151703974000.26578.2874964402485950653.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 9:19 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <151703974570.26578.3809646715924406820.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 9:25 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <151703975137.26578.11230688940391207602.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28 9:29 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
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