mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 12:36:33 +0100 (CET)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801281232130.2126@nanos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180128085500.djlm5rlbhjlpfj4i@gmail.com>

On Sun, 28 Jan 2018, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> > +
> > +#ifndef __NOSPEC_H__
> > +#define __NOSPEC_H__

_LINUX_NOSPEC_H

We have an established practice for those header guards...

> > +/*
> > + * When idx is out of bounds (idx >= sz), the sign bit will be set.
> > + * Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of zero
> > + * for an out of bounds idx, or ~0UL if within bounds [0, sz).
> > + */
> > +#ifndef array_idx_mask
> > +static inline unsigned long array_idx_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
> > +{
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx usage.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * Even if the cpu speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
> 
> s/cpu/CPU
> 
> > +	 * sign bit of idx is taken into account when generating the
> > +	 * mask.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
> > +	 * idx and sz are less than LONG_MAX.
> 
> Please use 'idx' and 'sz' in quotes, to make sure they stand out more in free 
> flowing comment text. Also please use '()' to denote functions/methods.
> 
> I.e. something like:
> 
> 	 * Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx() usage.
> 	 *
> 	 * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE() branch, the
> 	 * sign bit of 'idx' is taken into account when generating the
> 	 * mask.
> 	 *
> 	 * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
> 	 * 'idx' and 'sz' are less than LONG_MAX.

I rather prefer to have a proper kernel doc instead of the comment above
the function and then use @idx and @sz in the code comments.

Thanks,

	tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-28 11:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-27 19:26 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
     [not found] ` <151703972396.26578.7326612698912543866.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  8:55   ` [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 11:36     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-01-28 16:28     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:33       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 16:45         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:36       ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30  6:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 19:38           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 20:13             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 20:27               ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31  8:03                 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-31 14:13                   ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 14:21                     ` Greg KH
     [not found] ` <151703972912.26578.6792656143278523491.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  9:02   ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask Ingo Molnar
     [not found] ` <151703973427.26578.15693075353773519333.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  9:14   ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 20:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30  6:56       ` Ingo Molnar
     [not found] ` <151703974000.26578.2874964402485950653.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  9:19   ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Ingo Molnar
     [not found] ` <151703974570.26578.3809646715924406820.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  9:25   ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Ingo Molnar
     [not found] ` <151703975137.26578.11230688940391207602.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
2018-01-28  9:29   ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 15:22     ` Andy Lutomirski

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=alpine.DEB.2.20.1801281232130.2126@nanos \
    --to=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=cnovikov@lynx.com \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®