From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Fred Jacobs <fjacobs@vmware.com>, Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/spectre: Expand test for vulnerability to empty RSB exploits
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 18:24:50 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1808201823560.1551@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALMp9eTSNA_52tdgqeqMpBYMkPTvhGtwwWyGMwQKH3cyiS0agA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 20 Aug 2018, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 9:00 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 7 Aug 2018, Jim Mattson wrote:
> >
> > > Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB
> > > conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined
> > > simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily
> > > signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should
> > > also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that
> > > can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a
> > > vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the
> > > DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
> > >
> > > Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on
> > > hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
> > >
> > > For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A
> > > Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001),
> > > section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> > > Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
> >
> > That has been superseeded by:
> >
> > fdf82a7856b3 ("x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB")
> >
> > right? At least it does not apply anymore...
>
> Right. It doesn't appear that Skylake CPUs get any special treatment any more.
Yeah, it's universally f*cked up by now.
Thanks,
tglx
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-20 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-07 22:25 Jim Mattson
2018-08-08 15:53 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-08-20 16:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-08-20 16:22 ` Jim Mattson
2018-08-20 16:24 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
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