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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	djm@mindrot.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu,
	pmoore@redhat.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 14:16:20 +1000 (EST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1204131414580.22039@tundra.namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Thu, 12 Apr 2012, Will Drewry wrote:
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index d85b793..0b06685 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2016,6 +2016,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
>  		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
>  		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
> +		 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
> +		 */
> +		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
> +			return -EPERM;
>  	} else {
>  		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
>  		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
> @@ -2029,7 +2036,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
>  	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
>  
> -	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> +	if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
> +	    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
>  		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
>  
>  	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
> -- 

What about dynamic transitions in SELinux ?


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-04-13  4:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-04-12 21:47 Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 02/15] Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 06/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:18   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:16   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:11   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-18  2:28   ` Paul Gortmaker
2012-04-18  2:53     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:17 ` [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Kees Cook
2012-04-13  4:16 ` James Morris [this message]
2012-04-13  4:25   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:34     ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:40       ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-14  1:45 ` James Morris
2012-04-14  3:06   ` Will Drewry

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