From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 20:19:03 +1000 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1210052018330.18216@tundra.namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1349382154-9804-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, 4 Oct 2012, Kees Cook wrote:
> Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
> the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
> Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
> read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
> read extended attributes for signatures, etc.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-10-05 10:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-10-04 20:22 [PATCH v5] module: add syscall to load module from fd Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] " Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook Kees Cook
2012-10-05 10:19 ` James Morris [this message]
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 3/4] ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 4/4] add finit_module syscall to asm-generic Kees Cook
2012-10-05 3:56 ` Rusty Russell
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-09-20 22:14 [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd Kees Cook
2012-09-20 22:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook Kees Cook
2012-09-21 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
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