From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A38EC43382 for ; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 22:13:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0B73216E3 for ; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 22:13:48 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org D0B73216E3 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=namei.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727758AbeI1EeO (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:34:14 -0400 Received: from namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:33474 "EHLO namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725972AbeI1EeO (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:34:14 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by namei.org (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id w8RMDWQO011504; Thu, 27 Sep 2018 22:13:32 GMT Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 08:13:32 +1000 (AEST) From: James Morris To: Casey Schaufler cc: LSM , SE Linux , LKLM , John Johansen , Kees Cook , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , Alexey Dobriyan , =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Salvatore Mesoraca Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/19] SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning In-Reply-To: <5360cd42-5827-58af-515c-6e1ded1d9154@schaufler-ca.com> Message-ID: References: <5360cd42-5827-58af-515c-6e1ded1d9154@schaufler-ca.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LRH 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 21 Sep 2018, Casey Schaufler wrote: > The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense > if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this > patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules > and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has > to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure > at some later date. If it's useful, it should be incorporated into core LSM, otherwise that's a regression for SELinux. -- James Morris