From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758729AbcLTKcD (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Dec 2016 05:32:03 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:48515 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756477AbcLTKb7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Dec 2016 05:31:59 -0500 Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 11:31:57 +0100 (CET) From: Jiri Kosina X-X-Sender: jkosina@pobox.suse.cz To: Greg KH cc: NeilBrown , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: <20161214185000.GA3930@kroah.com> <87k2b0wus6.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name> <20161216124913.GB31485@kroah.com> <20161220092734.GA12200@kroah.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (LSU 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 20 Dec 2016, Jiri Kosina wrote: > I stay totally unconvinced that such kind of countermeasure brings any > value whatsoever. Could you please bring up a particular usecase, where > you have complete control over kernel memory, and still the only > possible exploit factor is redirecting usermodhelper? It feels like > rather random shot into darkness. If we want to make usermod helper really secure, perhaps the best way to go would be to completely nuke it and handle everyhting in udev; that'd be quite some work though, especially so that we don't break all the corner cases of module autoloading (request_module() and such). Thanks, -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs