From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mta1.migadu.com (out-189.mta1.migadu.com [95.215.58.189]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BEF8D40DB20 for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2026 09:30:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=95.215.58.189 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786527025; cv=none; b=hcOU/L+vHzgomyncUWAVdgJk62lzf/l5FL9gMnc3l8UzPRMcP+v7KmI2rdWoTsV9P2iVOOCYYgtVrL3b+cifDSnIGbggS4HpV9e7aTqUex70jdoQH03D47KQg61CWUre8uQeodFNNT94piKwOuc1+lKCyxBw5z0cAVRINW3msHk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786527025; c=relaxed/simple; bh=5Hb81DX76S8IAtLPuaQ2fxU+mq3IGFWwbuaXDXn7mzM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=XMMeTXZtVYBi/cENPMF6aX7P1devNE1slNqX4/oGeXSoFAkh18afbIwHyd2cUmTxC3jRaOn5x7msF+rL4IZWnVxkCtrr3JEkOuMYVywkM4W1a00Y2lYPVS84jCVyvClQevxbXrseVOmQwDTDRJlC69pLYN70Y8FWoDDeK9dBP2s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b=K+KKG6z9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=95.215.58.189 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b="K+KKG6z9" X-Envelope-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; bh=5Hb81DX76S8IAtLPuaQ2fxU+mq3IGFWwbuaXDXn7mzM=; c=simple/simple; d=linux.dev; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type; s=key1; t=1786527020; v=1; x=1787131820; b=K+KKG6z9cIX9FtV4SGWxRFZtkclJ4Ip7BFSWS0p9EXL4lcbba2/pLfi2aZfUuk+5r3CDEm1j W6szvLRQ6EhL+a+giwTbBdWM3A40Qo2tyt/eFA104x0TxZSuEnJxPhsqGTe5Au2rrkD2koxtgFK /EtO5qN45kjk2sssO05EjFmU= X-Envelope-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Received: from localhost (3.112.29.171) by mta11.migadu.com with ESMTPS id 5cf300efea8cce09; Wed, 12 Aug 2026 09:30:20 +0000 X-Migadu-Scanner: mta11.migadu.com Authentication-Results: mta11.migadu.com; none Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 17:30:08 +0800 From: Baoquan He To: Jan Sebastian =?iso-8859-1?Q?G=F6tte?= Cc: Andrew Morton , Mike Rapoport , Pasha Tatashin , Pratyush Yadav , Dave Young , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Lukas Wunner , Ignat Korchagin , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Keith Busch , Jens Axboe , Christoph Hellwig , Sagi Grimberg , Trond Myklebust , Anna Schumaker , Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Marc Dionne , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , Eric Biggers , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Jaegeuk Kim , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , Alasdair Kergon , Mike Snitzer , Mikulas Patocka , Benjamin Marzinski , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] kexec: add CRASH_WIPE_SECRETS to wipe secrets before kdump Message-ID: References: <20260811-crash-zeroize-rework-v2-0-9561d13c2340@jaseg.de> <20260811-crash-zeroize-rework-v2-1-9561d13c2340@jaseg.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20260811-crash-zeroize-rework-v2-1-9561d13c2340@jaseg.de> On 08/11/26 at 07:52pm, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: .....snip... > @@ -142,6 +170,7 @@ void __noclone __crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs) > crash_save_vmcoreinfo(); > machine_crash_shutdown(&fixed_regs); > crash_cma_clear_pending_dma(); > + crash_wipe_secrets(); I remember when crash_cma added this, we argued a lot about the risk, finally it's added in with an added note to tell it's an opt-in feature and risky. I don't know if it opens a Pandora box, I think anything wanted being here need prove anything else has been tried, and the thing is very very important. If we don't guard the door well, one day one guy cold come and said I need ask Oracle database to do some transactions before juming into kdump kernel because the actions will save billions of dollar. And what does security people say about this wiping? Is it very important information and wiping is mandotary? There's no any other way to wipe it or pollute it, no way in kdump kernel? I noticed it's happening on en embedded target, is it possible you do this on your embedded kernel tree, but not mainline tree? Anyone who wants to do thing like this, please prepare answers for them, and be ready to accept failure. Thanks Baoquan > machine_kexec(kexec_crash_image); > } > kexec_unlock(); > > -- > 2.53.0 >